judge20 sources, dated 2024-11-25 – 2026-10-26· last searched 2026-10-29
Associate Justice, Second District, Division One
Overview
Synthesized 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session from 14 sources dated 2024-11-25 to 2026-10-26. Machine-written; numbers link to the sources below.
Michelle C. Kim, a former Los Angeles County public defender and Superior Court judge, has sat on Division One since her unanimous confirmation in November 2024 20,15. The State Bar's evaluation commission rated her "exceptionally well qualified" 20,2. From October 2024 to October 2026 she wrote 7 published majority opinions and no dissents or concurrences, all in civil, family or juvenile matters 19. Her opinions read statutes closely and decide narrowly: FEHA does not displace the presumption of corporate separateness (Oct. 2026) 1; a jury trial begins when the venire is sworn for voir dire (Sept. 2026) 3; LADWP's tiered water rates satisfy Proposition 218 (Dec. 2025), a ruling the Supreme Court has since taken up 7,8. Outcomes do not track party type: public entities won in Dreher and Krug and lost in O.B. and Lugo 14,13,11,7.
Record
Oct. 2024 to Oct. 2026: 7 authored published opinions, 0 separate opinions; none criminal (published opinions only).19
Oct. 2026, Villasenor v. Schneiter: FEHA plaintiff must rebut the presumption of corporate separateness to collect from an owner; affirmed for the owner.1
Sept. 2026, Wilson v. Johnson: reversed a five-year-rule dismissal; trial began when the jury panel was sworn.3
Dec. 2025, Dreher v. City of Los Angeles: upheld LADWP tiered rates and the pay-under-protest rule, disagreeing with Patz v. City of San Diego; review later granted.7,8,5
Nov. 2025, County of Los Angeles v. Lugo: a self-represented father's paternity set-aside request was timely under pre-2020 law, deferring to Judicial Council forms.11
July 2025, O.B. v. LAUSD: AB 218's revival of childhood sexual-assault claims against public entities is not a gift of public funds.13
Apr. 2025, Krug v. CSU: Labor Code expense-reimbursement duty does not reach CSU.14
Stated positions
No campaign statements, interviews or questionnaire answers were found; her views appear only through her opinions.17,4,2
Praise & support
Rated "exceptionally well qualified" before appointment. — Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation20,2
Dreher is a practical approach to administering tiered water rates. — Best Best & Krieger5
Where sources disagree
One stored copy of Dreher notes the Supreme Court granted review; the other copy carries no such notice.7,8
What we could not find
No criticism of her record from any source.
No separate opinions, oral arguments or interviews.
Unpublished opinions, most of her output, are not covered.
No criminal opinions in the published record.
Questions to consider
How will the Supreme Court resolve the Dreher/Patz split on tiered water rates?
Do her unpublished opinions follow the same narrow, text-first pattern?
How does she approach criminal appeals, which are absent from her published work?
Analysis of their legal writing and words
Written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session from 5 primary texts1,3,7,11,13. An evaluative machine reading: check each point against its quoted evidence.
Coverage: Sample follows a fixed rule applied to every appellate justice: from the court's published-opinion listings (Oct 2024 to Oct 2026), all separate opinions (newest first, up to 3), then the most recent authored opinions, up to 5 texts. Kim has no published separate opinions in the period, so the sample is her 5 most recent authored majority opinions (court_opinion), July 2025 to October 2026: Villasenor v. Schneiter (S1, FEHA and alter ego), Wilson v. Johnson (S2, five-year trial deadline), Dreher v. City of Los Angeles (S3, Proposition 218 water rates; about 149,000 characters, read selectively), County of Los Angeles v. Lugo (S4, paternity set-aside deadline) and O.B. v. LAUSD (S5, AB 218 and the gift clause). All civil or family; no criminal opinions, dissents, concurrences, oral arguments or unscripted remarks.
A text-and-precedent judge who decides narrowly. She starts from statutory text and the presumptions courts use to read it (against displacing common law in S1, plain language over headings in S3), and reads earlier cases for only what they decided (S1, S2). She defers to other institutions where doctrine directs: the Legislature's choices (S1), the Judicial Council's form interpretation (S4), and the trial court's unchallenged findings (S1). She will openly reject a sister court's majority (Patz in S3). Outcomes do not track party type: plaintiffs lose in S1 and S3 and win in S2, S4 and S5; public entities win in S3 and lose in S5. The sample does not support a political label.
In their words: No self-description appears in the sample; the opinions speak institutionally as "we."
Articulation: StrongConsistency: Adequate
Articulation. Prepared texts only. Each opinion states the question and answer in the first paragraphs, then builds the legal framework before applying it (S1, S2, S4). She meets the losing side's authorities one by one and explains why each does not apply (Williams, Arave, Flannery in S1; Kadota, Hartman, Hilliard in S2). S3 is very long, which its ratemaking record largely explains. Prose is plain, with occasional edge ("foist" in S3).
Consistency. Across 15 months the method is stable: text first, presumptions applied as stated, precedent confined to its holding, and narrow dispositions. No position changes appear. Five civil opinions with no separate writing are a modest base, and there is nothing in criminal law to compare.
Positions
Statutes and the common law: A statute does not alter a common-law rule unless its text or evident purpose shows that intent; a general purpose clause is not enough.
“We conclude FEHA’s stated purpose does not manifest a legislative intent to alter the presumption of corporate separateness, because the presumption is compatible with FEHA’s purpose to provide effective remedies.”12026-10-26
Proposition 218 and tiered water rates: Rates must be proportional to cost of service, not traced parcel by parcel; tiered rates passing higher supply costs to heavier users are valid.
“The Constitution requires proportionality, not exactness.”72025-12-08
“We reject the Drehers’ attempt to foist onto the City a more stringent standard than the Constitution imposes.”72025-12-08
When a jury trial begins: A jury action is brought to trial when a panel assembles for voir dire and takes the section 232(a) oath, whether or not counsel have begun questioning.
“That the parties did not commence their examination does not alter our conclusion the action was brought to trial within the deadline.”32026-09-22
Deference to the Judicial Council: The Judicial Council's reasonable reading of statutes in its forms gets substantial weight, while the court may still point out the forms' gaps.
“Giving appropriate deference to the Judicial Council’s reasonable interpretation of statutes in adopting forms FL-280 and FL-281”112025-11-21
“We encourage the Judicial Council to consider revising form FL-281”112025-11-21
Legislative revival of claims against public entities: Reviving lapsed abuse claims is not a gift of public funds where the entity was already substantively liable.
“Because AB 218 did not create a new substantive liability, its revival of previously barred causes of action based on this liability did not violate the gift clause.”132025-07-31
Stated principles (3)
Precedent binds only for what it decided.
“No case considered precisely when the action was brought to trial”32026-09-22
“They did not consider whether FEHA modifies any common law rule, and FEHA contains no statutory provision addressing alter ego liability.”12026-10-26
Plain text controls; aids like headings cannot create ambiguity.
“We need not resort to title or chapter headings to interpret plain language that needs no clarification.”72025-12-08
Decide only the question presented.
“We express no opinion as to the merits.”112025-11-21
Notable rhetoric
Reports when research found no controlling authority (S1: "The parties cite no authority—and our research has uncovered none").
Rejects arguments that rest on speculation in direct terms (S3: will not reverse on "nothing more than speculation").
Adopts a dissent's reasoning and names the majority she rejects (Patz in S3).
Addresses institutional readers directly, urging the Judicial Council to fix a form (S4).
Limits: Published opinions are a minority of a justice's work; most decisions are unpublished and this sample omits them. Majority opinions are joined by colleagues, so wording is not hers alone. No separate opinions exist in the period to show her views apart from a panel. Dreher was read selectively.
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LAist's guide to the LA and Orange County appellate retention races explains what Court of Appeal justices do and lists each candidate with a State Bar evaluation rating. It lists Michelle C. Kim as an Associate Justice appointed by Gov. Gavin Newsom and rated "Exceptionally well qualified" by the State Bar (2022).
State Bar evaluation rating for Michelle C. Kim: Exceptionally well qualified (2022).
Appointed by Gov. Gavin Newsom.
Retention votes are yes/no; justices serve 12-year terms, and new justices may first serve the remainder of a predecessor's term.
Voters elect appellate justices by district, not division.
Facts, claims & caveats
State Bar rating
Exceptionally well qualified (2022)
Appointing governor
Gavin Newsom
LAist, citing a state analysis, reports that no California appellate justice has lost a retention election since the system began in the 1930s.
Bill Raftery of the National Center for State Courts says retention elections were meant as the people's opportunity to remove a justice who is bad at the job.
LAist says a vote here is largely about signaling support or not for what a justice has done.
Limits: Gives a rating, appointing governor and job title only; no analysis of the justice's opinions. The stored copy may omit content loaded by script.
California Secretary of Stateofficial analysisRecord
The Secretary of State's list of judicial ballot questions for the Nov. 3, 2026 election includes "Shall Associate Justice MICHELLE C. KIM be elected to the office for the term provided by law?" under the Second District, Division One. This confirms the justice is on the ballot.
Michelle C. Kim appears as a yes/no retention question for Associate Justice, Second District, Division One.
Second District voters: Los Angeles, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura counties.
Facts, claims & caveats
Ballot question
Retention of Michelle C. Kim, Associate Justice, Second District, Division One
List date
2026-08-24
Limits: Official ballot listing only; no information about the justice's record.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Secretary of Stateofficial analysisNeutral
The Secretary of State's official 2026 voter guide lists Michelle C. Kim as an Associate Justice of the Second District, Division One, among the 18 Second District justices on the retention ballot. The page is a roster only; it links to court biographies and gives no qualifications or evaluations.
Lists Michelle C. Kim, Associate Justice, Division One, Second District.
Second District sits in Los Angeles (Divisions 1-5, 7, 8) and Ventura (Division 6).
Facts, claims & caveats
Office
Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second District, Division One
Ballot
Retention (yes/no), Nov. 3, 2026
Limits: A list of names with biography links; says nothing about the justice's record.
Best Best & Krieger, a firm that advises public agencies, summarizes Dreher v. LADWP (Dec. 8, 2025) as good news for tiered water rates: the court upheld LADWP's budget-based tiers, rejected Patz v. City of San Diego, and required payment under protest for refunds. It does not name the opinion's author.
Holdings as BBK describes them: supply costs may be allocated to higher tiers despite commingling; breakpoints need no cost basis; peaking costs may go to upper tiers; refunds are not presumed.
BBK notes the decision "vocally diverges" from Patz and may lead to Supreme Court review.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Dreher v. City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
Decision date
2025-12-08
BBK calls the ruling a practical approach to administering water rates.
BBK says the Court of Appeal expressly rejected the Patz and Coziahr majority reasoning.
Limits: Commentary by a law firm that represents public agencies, which favors the result; it doesn't evaluate the justice.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Judicial Branch of Californiadecision recordRecord
Census of Kim's published opinions for Division One from October 2024 to October 2026: 7 authored majority opinions and no dissents or concurrences.
All 7 are civil or family/juvenile matters; none is a criminal appeal.
Several involve public entities: LADWP (Dreher), LAUSD (O.B.), CSU (Krug), Los Angeles County (Lugo).
Others: FEHA alter-ego liability (Villasenor), the five-year trial deadline (Wilson), a juvenile case (In re A.O.).
Facts, claims & caveats
Authored published opinions
7
Separate opinions
0
Period
October 2024 to October 2026
Limits: Published opinions only; most appellate decisions are unpublished, so this is a minority of her work. Compiled from court listings, with authorship read from signature blocks; it does not show panels she joined without writing.
Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1court opinionRecord
Opinion by Kim, J. (Rothschild, P.J., Weingart, J.). Held FEHA does not displace the common-law presumption that a corporation is separate from its owner, so a harassment plaintiff who won against two restaurant companies could not collect from their sole owner without rebutting that presumption. Affirmed.
Starts from the strong presumption that statutes do not abrogate the common law (McMillin, Presbyterian Camp).
Finds FEHA's purpose clause and liberal-construction rule do not 'clearly and unequivocally' alter alter-ego doctrine; FEHA says nothing about alter ego.
Distinguishes the fee-asymmetry cases (Williams, Arave, Pollock, Ramirez): they construed FEHA's express fee provision and 'are not authority for propositions not considered.'
Notes the plaintiff did not challenge the finding that her evidence failed to rebut the presumption, and reached her new legal argument as a pure question of law.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Villasenor v. Schneiter, B337209 (2d Dist., Div. 1)
Disposition
Affirmed; parties bear own costs
Underlying verdict
$345,061.17 compensatory and $100,000 punitive damages against the corporate defendants; about $950,000 in fees awarded
The court concludes FEHA's stated purpose is compatible with the presumption because a plaintiff may still rebut it.
Villasenor argued FEHA should be read to create a presumption favoring alter-ego liability.
Limits: One published civil opinion; it decides a narrow legal question and does not review the evidence on alter ego.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1court opinionRecord
Opinion by Kim, J. (Bendix, Acting P.J., Weingart, J.). Reversed a five-year-rule dismissal of a personal-injury suit: following Stueve v. Nemer, a jury case is 'brought to trial' when a panel assembles for voir dire and takes the section 232(a) oath, even if the parties have not begun questioning.
Holds the action was brought to trial on March 16, 2023, four days before the deadline.
Reads Kadota, Hartman and Hilliard as not deciding the narrower timing question, since questioning began the same day in each.
Cites the Trial Jury Selection and Management Act's definitions and the Standards of Judicial Administration (hardship questioning is part of voir dire).
Does not reach tolling or the plaintiff's due process objection to a one-night opposition deadline.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Wilson v. Johnson, B329690 (2d Dist., Div. 1)
Disposition
Judgment of dismissal reversed; plaintiff gets costs
Respondents argued the panels were not assembled for voir dire and that trial begins only when the parties examine jurors; the court rejects both.
Limits: A procedural ruling on trial timing; it says nothing about the merits of the injury claim.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1court opinionRecord
Opinion by Kim, J. (Weingart, Acting P.J., Adams, J.). Upheld LADWP's tiered residential water rates under Proposition 218's proportionality rule and held refunds of the invalid low-income subsidy charge required payment under protest (Health & Safety Code 5472). Expressly disagreed with the divided Fourth District decision in Patz v. City of San Diego.
'The Constitution requires proportionality, not exactness': no duty to trace each water source to each parcel.
Adopts the Capistrano approach and the Patz dissent: higher tiers may bear the incremental cost of more expensive supply; tier breakpoints need no cost justification if rates do not exceed costs.
Plain text of section 5471 covers water charges; code headings cannot create ambiguity.
Finds no prejudice from excluding expert testimony absent any showing of what an expert would say.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Dreher v. City of Los Angeles, B329610 (2d Dist., Div. 1)
Disposition
Affirmed; LADWP recovers costs
Below
Trial court invalidated the embedded low-income subsidy but denied refunds
The Drehers and amici, including Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation, argued the City had to show actual cost of each tier by source; the court calls this standard 'virtually impossible to meet.'
Limits: Read selectively (about 149,000 characters; opening, the payment-under-protest and proportionality sections, and the end). This copy carries no notice of later Supreme Court action; another stored copy notes review was granted.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Opinion by Kim, J. (Weingart, Acting P.J., concurring). Upheld LADWP's four-tier residential water rates under Proposition 218's proportionality rule and held ratepayers must pay under protest (Health & Safety Code § 5472) to get refunds. It expressly disagreed with the Fourth District's divided Patz v. City of San Diego decision. The header notes the Supreme Court later granted review.
Proposition 218 requires rates proportional to the cost of service, "not exactness"; agencies need not trace water from source to parcel.
Adopts the Capistrano approach and the Patz dissent: higher tiers may bear the incremental cost of more expensive supply.
Tier breakpoints need no cost-based justification so long as rates within tiers do not exceed costs.
Plain-language reading of § 5471 brings water charges under the pay-under-protest rule, rejecting the Drehers' reliance on headings and legislative history.
Leaves in place the trial court's ruling that the embedded low-income subsidy was unconstitutional; no refund without protest.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Dreher v. City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, B329610
Outcome
Judgment affirmed
Status
Review granted by the California Supreme Court (per header)
Author
M. Kim, J.
The Drehers argued the City had to determine exact supply costs per parcel; the court called this an attempt to impose a standard stricter than the Constitution.
The court says it disagrees with the Patz majority on tracing and tier breakpoints.
Limits: Review granted, so the opinion is not final law; read selectively (about 150,000 characters).
Long document: only the first 30,000 characters were summarized.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1court opinionRecord
Opinion by Kim, J. (Bendix, Acting P.J., Weingart, J.). Reversed an order denying as untimely a self-represented father's request to set aside a 2015 voluntary declaration of paternity. Deferring to the Judicial Council's form interpretation, it held pre-2020 declarations remain subject to the old deadline: a reasonable time, up to six months, after the first support order.
Applies Family Code section 4(e): validity of an order made before a law change is governed by old law; a filed declaration is equivalent to a judgment.
Gives the Judicial Council's interpretation in forms FL-280/FL-281 'great weight' (Sara M.) and finds it not clearly erroneous.
Rejects the County's legislative-intent (federal funding) argument.
Urges the Judicial Council to revise form FL-281, which omits the 'reasonable time' and 'initial order' limits; expresses no view on the fraud claim.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
County of Los Angeles v. Lugo, B344575 (2d Dist., Div. 1)
Disposition
Reversed and remanded to hear the request on the merits
Support order
$584 per month, entered April 30, 2024
Request filed
October 8, 2024, five months and eight days later
Lugo declared DNA testing in 2015 showed he was not the father; the court treats this only as background.
Limits: Decides timeliness only; the merits of the set-aside request remain open.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Opinion by Kim, J. (Rothschild, P.J., and Weingart, J., concurring), certified for publication Aug. 27, 2025. Reversing the trial court, it held AB 218's revival of lapsed childhood sexual assault claims against public entities does not violate the constitutional gift clause, because the school district was already substantively liable; AB 218 only removed the claim-presentation barrier.
Frames the test as whether the Legislature created new substantive liability or removed a procedural obstacle, following the First District's West Contra Costa decision.
Relies on Chapman v. State (1894): a statute giving a new remedy for a pre-existing liability is not a gift.
Holds claim presentation is an element a plaintiff must plead, not an element of the entity's substantive liability.
Does not reach the public-purpose argument.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
O.B. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, B339555
Outcome
Judgment on the pleadings reversed; motion to be denied on remand
Author
M. Kim, J.
LAUSD argued AB 218 retroactively created liability where none existed and so was a gift of public funds; the court rejected that framing.
The trial court had found AB 218 an unconstitutional gift; the Court of Appeal disagreed.
Limits: Joins an existing appellate position (West Contra Costa) rather than breaking new ground; the document does not report later Supreme Court action.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Opinion by Kim, J. (Bendix, Acting P.J., and Weingart, J., concurring), on remand from the Supreme Court. Applying Stone v. Alameda Health System, the court held Labor Code section 2802's expense-reimbursement duty does not reach CSU, so a professor who bought home-office equipment for pandemic remote teaching cannot recover from CSU. Affirmed.
Reads section 2802's undefined "employer" as ambiguous, then resolves it from statutory structure and history rather than policy.
Finds "positive indicia" of intent to exclude public employers: the Legislature expressly covered public employers elsewhere, never amended section 2802 to do so, and did so only for public-hospital training costs.
Decides without reaching the sovereign-powers maxim.
Rejects reliance on wage orders and Labor Commissioner (DLSE) letters by both sides.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Krug v. Board of Trustees of the California State University, B320588
Outcome
Judgment of dismissal affirmed on remand
Author
M. Kim, J.
The court states the Legislature declined to apply section 2802 to public employers when it expressly did so for other obligations.
Krug argued the unqualified word "employer" covers all employers; the court found that reading reasonable but outweighed by structure and history.
Limits: One statutory-interpretation ruling for a public employer; the result follows a Supreme Court framework (Stone) the panel was directed to apply.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Judicial Council news release announcing that the Commission on Judicial Appointments unanimously confirmed Michelle C. Kim to the Second District Court of Appeal on Nov. 25, 2024, with short biographies of the three appointees (Hoffstadt, Kim, Richardson).
Kim fills the seat vacated by retiring Justice Victoria D. Chaney; LA Superior Court judge since 2018; deputy alternate public defender 2005-2018 and deputy public defender 2003-2005; J.D., UCLA.
Confirmed by unanimous vote of Chief Justice Guerrero, Attorney General Bonta and Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert.
California Courts (Second District Court of Appeal)otherNeutral
Official court biography. Kim, on Division One since 2024, was a Los Angeles County deputy public defender and deputy alternate public defender who tried felony jury trials for indigent clients, then an LA Superior Court judge (criminal limited-jurisdiction supervision; unlimited civil calendars) appointed by Gov. Brown.
Nominated by Gov. Newsom; rated "exceptionally well qualified" by the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation; unanimously confirmed.
Former Head Deputy at the LA County Alternate Public Defender's Office.
Superior Court: Assistant Supervising Judge (criminal, limited jurisdiction), site judge, unlimited civil calendars at Spring Street and Stanley Mosk.
B.A. Stanford (American Studies); J.D. UCLA.
Vice Chair, LA Judicial Selection Advisory Committee; 2025 Judicial Service Award, Southern California Chinese Lawyers Association.
Facts, claims & caveats
Court
Second District, Division One, since 2024
JNE rating
Exceptionally well qualified
Prior
LA Superior Court judge; deputy public defender / alternate public defender
Limits: Self-published official biography; no opinions or evaluations of her appellate work.
Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.