judge17 sources, dated 2024-05-14 – 2026-10-07· last searched 2026-10-29
Presiding Justice, Second District, Division Seven
Overview
Synthesized 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session from 13 sources dated 2024-05-14 to 2026-10-07. Machine-written; numbers link to the sources below.
Gonzalo C. Martinez joined Division Seven in 2023 and was confirmed 3-0 as its Presiding Justice in 2024, after serving as a deputy solicitor general and as Gov. Newsom's deputy judicial appointments secretary 14,11. From October 2024 to October 2026 he wrote 12 published opinions (about nine distinct cases) and no published dissents or concurrences 17. His recent opinions are unanimous, civil, and narrowly framed, and their outcomes do not favor one side: he set aside Los Angeles County's approval of Tejon Ranch's Centennial project over a misleading cap-and-trade emissions analysis while rejecting the environmental groups' other claims (2025) 6,7; upheld advance written meal-break waivers for an employer (2025) 9,8; vacated statewide injunctions two charities had won against the Attorney General because they never pleaded or proved a right to them (2025) 10; required the County to bargain with a deputies' union before outsourcing (2026) 4; and upheld Los Angeles's eviction threshold while striking its relocation-fee ordinance (2026) 3. At his 2024 confirmation, supporters praised him while two jurists noted his short appellate tenure 11. Reform California opposes retention without reasons; blogger Daniel Faigin supports it 13,1.
Record
Oct 2024 to Oct 2026: 12 published authored opinions and 0 published separate opinions; repeat versions (Bradsbery three times, Catholic Medical Mission Bd. v. Bonta twice) leave about nine distinct cases, mostly civil and public law. Published opinions only; none listed after May 2026.17
Apr/May 2026, Apartment Assn. v. City of Los Angeles: upheld the City's eviction threshold as within its police power; held the relocation-assistance ordinance preempted by Costa-Hawkins, following the division's Pasadena precedent.3
Apr 2026, L.A. County Professional Peace Officers Assn. v. County of L.A.: reversed and ordered the County to meet and confer before outsourcing security work; the MOU's 'any reorganization' clause was too vague to waive bargaining rights.4
June 2025, Center for Biological Diversity v. County of Los Angeles: affirmed setting aside the Centennial project approval; the EIR wrongly counted suppliers' cap-and-trade compliance against 96 percent of the project's emissions and inadequately analyzed off-site wildfire risk; the groups' wildlife, vegetation, and alternatives claims failed.6,7
Apr/May 2025, Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating: affirmed for the employer, holding revocable prospective written waivers of the meal period for five-to-six-hour shifts enforceable absent coercion or unconscionability.9,8
Mar 2025, Catholic Medical Mission Bd. v. Bonta: vacated permanent injunctions barring the Attorney General from enforcing parts of the charitable-solicitation law, holding injunctions are not automatic even in First Amendment cases; affirmed the trial court's reformation and severance of the cease-and-desist provision.10
Stated positions
At his May 2024 confirmation: 'I will pause and think about whether what I am doing is the right thing under the circumstances and the law.'11
His opinions repeatedly limit holdings to the case at hand, for example declining to decide whether a city may eliminate nonpayment as a ground for eviction (2026) and reserving coerced or irrevocable meal-break waivers (2025).3,9,8
Praise & support
Praised at confirmation as 'measured, matter of fact, collaborative, and insightful', with a 'well qualified' rating and no objections among 13 people contacted. — Bay Area Reporter (reporting supporters including Ana Matosantos and 15 bar associations)11
Recommends retention, finding no scandals or discipline (drawing on AI-generated summaries). — Daniel Faigin (cahighways.org)1
Called the Centennial ruling 'a victory for Los Angeles and California.' — Center for Biological Diversity7
Criticism & concerns
Recommends DO NOT RETAIN, as for 30 of 33 Second District justices, with no reasons. — Reform California13
In 2024 two unnamed jurists said his short appellate tenure could make the presiding role challenging at first. — Bay Area Reporter (anonymous jurists)11
Notes his ties to the Governor's office draw 'standard philosophical scrutiny' about independence from the executive, without citing any opinion. — Daniel Faigin (cahighways.org)1
Where sources disagree
Faigin attributes his 'well qualified' rating to the State Bar; the Bay Area Reporter attributes it to the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation.1,11
What we could not find
No published dissents or concurrences, so nothing shows where he disagrees with colleagues.
No criminal, family, or dependency opinions in the sample; the census lists only three such captions.
Unpublished opinions, most of his output, are not collected.
No interviews or statements since his 2024 confirmation, and no substantive argument against retention.
Questions to consider
Does a record with no published separate opinions reflect consensus-building as presiding justice, or simply few disagreements?
How do his rulings in cases involving the County, the City, or the Attorney General (S6, S9, S11) bear on the independence concern Faigin raises?
Has either side sought Supreme Court review of the 2026 Apartment Association ruling?
What does his unpublished criminal work show?
Analysis of their legal writing and words
Written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session from 5 primary texts3,4,6,8,10. An evaluative machine reading: check each point against its quoted evidence.
Coverage: Five published Division Seven opinions, March 2025 to April 2026, chosen by a fixed rule applied to every justice and counted by case (modification orders do not take slots): all separate opinions from his Oct 2024 to Oct 2026 published listings (he has none), then his five most recent authored opinions: tenant ordinances [S1], public-sector bargaining [S2], CEQA [S3], wage-and-hour [S4], and injunctions and statutory reformation in a First Amendment challenge to the charitable-solicitation law [S5]. All are civil and unanimous; long opinions (S1, S3, S5) were read selectively. No dissents, concurrences, speeches, or interviews.
Method-driven and narrow. He starts with text, reads documents as a whole, and turns to legislative and administrative history only when the text supports more than one reading [S4]. He places burdens explicitly on the party asserting an exception or waiver [S2]. He enforces procedural requirements strictly against government (CEQA's additionality rule against the County [S3]; a 'clear and unmistakable' waiver standard against the County as employer [S2]) while deferring to agencies on factual and policy choices (alternatives analysis [S3]) and to cities' police power over eviction grounds [S1]. He follows his division's own precedent [S1], repeatedly limits holdings to the facts before the court [S1, S4], and treats remedies as requiring their own pleading and proof, vacating injunctions charities won against the Attorney General while preserving a reformed statute [S5]. Outcomes do not track one side: a union, environmental groups, and the City partly won; an employer, landlords (on relocation fees), and the Attorney General (on remedy) also won.
In their words: No self-description appears in the sample; opinions speak for the panel ('we').
Articulation: StrongConsistency: Adequate
Articulation. Prepared texts only. Opinions state the holding up front, set out each side's argument (including amici's) before resolving it, and work through text, structure, and history in order [S1, S4]. Distinctions are concrete: S3 separates the refinery in AIR, itself a covered entity, from a housing project that is not; S4 shows why Brinker 'did not address' waiver timing. S2 answers the County's dictionary argument with case law on waiver standards. Weaknesses: heavy reliance on block quotations from prior opinions, notably the division's Pasadena decision in S1; S3 is very long. With no separate opinions, his individual voice cannot be separated from the panel's.
Consistency. Method is uniform across the five opinions (March 2025 to April 2026): plain text, whole-document reading, explicit burdens, narrow holdings. No contradictions found, and no shift in approach. The sample is too small and too short to judge consistency over time, and all five are unanimous civil cases.
Positions
Local tenant protections and state preemption: A city may set a monetary threshold before eviction for nonpayment as a substantive ground-for-eviction rule, but relocation payments triggered by lawful rent increases are preempted by Costa-Hawkins [S1].
“As a substantive regulation of the basis for eviction in the City of Los Angeles, the ordinance squarely falls within the City’s broad police power.”32026-04-15
“the burden it places on the exercise of statutory rights under the Costa-Hawkins Act attempts to prohibit, or at least restrict, lawful conduct permitted by state law”32026-04-15
Public-employee bargaining rights: A union waives statutory bargaining rights only by clear, specific language; a general management-rights clause is not enough [S2].
“The “any reorganization” language in the MOU is vague and ambiguous, falling short of the requirement that any waiver of statutory rights be clear and unmistakable.”42026-04-10
Climate analysis under CEQA: A land-use project cannot count energy suppliers' mandatory cap-and-trade compliance as offsetting its own emissions [S3].
“The project itself is not a covered entity under the cap-and-trade program”62025-06-26
“an offset cannot be credited both to the covered entities’ regulatory compliance and to the Centennial project’s emissions”62025-06-26
Meal-period waivers: Revocable written waivers signed in advance are valid for five-to-six-hour shifts, absent coercion or unconscionability, which the court reserves [S4].
“The text and legislative and administrative history do not support these arguments.”82025-05-21
“While we would hesitate to uphold a prospective written waiver under such circumstances, this case does not present them.”82025-05-21
Remedies against the government: A plaintiff who wins a constitutional ruling still must plead and prove entitlement to a permanent injunction; a court may reform and sever a statute to save it [S5].
“Permanent injunctions are not issued as a matter of course, even in cases implicating the First Amendment.”102025-03-27
“These cases reflect that reformation and severance are not mutually exclusive tools, as respondents argue, and that they may be used in combination.”102025-03-27
Stated principles (3)
Decide only what the case presents.
“The question of whether a city may eliminate a default in the payment of rent as a basis for eviction is not before us, and we limit our decision to the ordinance at issue here.”32026-04-15
“The question before us is narrow and of first impression”82025-05-21
Text first; history only when the text is open.
“Because the text of section 512 and the text of the wage orders are susceptible to both interpretations, we examine the relevant legislative and administrative history”82025-05-21
Strict on legally required procedure, deferential on agency policy choices.
“Project EIRs are “not ordinarily an occasion for the reconsideration or overhaul of fundamental land-use policy.””62025-06-26
Notable rhetoric
Repeatedly flags limits on the holding and questions reserved for later cases [S1, S4].
Records opposing-party concessions precisely, such as Tejon's statement at oral argument that a key table 'is misleading, yes' [S3].
Measured, impersonal prose with no rhetorical flourish; extended block quotations from precedent [S1].
Limits: Published opinions are a minority of a justice's work; his 12 published authored opinions in the period (per the census listing, about nine distinct cases) are a fraction of his decisions, and he wrote no published separate opinions, so the sample cannot show where he disagrees with colleagues. No criminal, family, or dependency case is included, and all opinions are joined by colleagues.
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Blogger Daniel Faigin's ballot analysis recommends retaining Martinez, finding nothing disqualifying. His discussion is drawn explicitly from 'Google AI' output.
Conclusion: Retain (Yes).
Reports, from Google AI, no ethical scandals or discipline and a unanimous 2024 confirmation as Division Seven's presiding justice.
Notes his prior roles as Newsom's deputy judicial appointments secretary and as a deputy solicitor general, saying such ties draw 'standard philosophical scrutiny' about independence from the executive.
Facts, claims & caveats
Recommendation
Retain (Yes)
Faigin, citing Google AI, says court watchers track Martinez's civil opinions for neutrality toward government litigants, without naming any such watcher or opinion.
Limits: Relies on AI-generated summaries rather than primary records. The guide says the JNE rating was 'well qualified' from 'the State Bar'; the Bay Area Reporter attributes that rating to the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-28.
Reform California's Los Angeles County voter guide recommends DO NOT RETAIN for Martinez, as it does for 30 of the 33 Second District justices it lists. No reasons are given.
Martinez: DO NOT RETAIN.
Only Victoria Chavez, Frances Rothschild, and Kenneth Yegan get RETAIN in the Second District.
Also recommends DO NOT RETAIN for both Supreme Court justices.
Facts, claims & caveats
Recommendation
Gonzalo C. Martinez (Presiding Justice) - DO NOT RETAIN
Reform California recommends not retaining Martinez.
Limits: A near-blanket partisan slate with no stated rationale; it says nothing specific about Martinez's record.
Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-28.
California Secretary of Stateofficial analysisNeutral
The Secretary of State's official guide lists Gonzalo C. Martinez, Presiding Justice, Division Seven, among the Second District justices on the Nov. 3, 2026 retention ballot. It gives names and divisions only.
Martinez is listed as Presiding Justice of Division Seven, with Associate Justice Natalie Stone.
No qualifications, ratings, or arguments appear on this page.
Facts, claims & caveats
Ballot listing
Gonzalo C. Martinez, Presiding Justice, Second District, Division Seven
Limits: A list only; it says nothing about the justice's record.
Judicial Branch of Californiadecision recordRecord
A ballotscope compilation of Presiding Justice Martinez's published opinions listed on courts.ca.gov from October 2024 to October 2026: 12 authored opinions and no separate opinions (no published dissents or concurrences). It covers published opinions only; most appellate decisions are unpublished.
Authored: 12; separate opinions: 0.
The 12 entries include repeat versions of the same case: Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating appears three times (opinion plus two modifications) and Catholic Medical Mission Bd. v. Bonta twice, so about nine distinct cases.
Mostly civil and public law: tenant ordinances (Apartment Assn. v. City of Los Angeles), public-sector labor (L.A. County Professional Peace Officers Assn.), CEQA (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of Los Angeles), wage-and-hour (Bradsbery), a suit against the Attorney General (Catholic Medical Mission Bd. v. Bonta), and a case against a law firm (Kaushansky v. Stonecroft Attorneys).
Criminal and juvenile captions are few: P. v. Padron, In re Tuilaepa, In re T.R.
Facts, claims & caveats
Authored published opinions (Oct 2024 to Oct 2026)
12
Separate published opinions
0
Most recent
Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles etc. v. City of Los Angeles, B336071, 2026-05-14
Division
Second Appellate District, Division 7
Limits: Published opinions only; unpublished decisions and opinions he joined without writing are not counted. Authorship was read from signature blocks by the compiler. Lists cases, not outcomes. No published opinion after May 2026 appears.
Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Sevencourt opinionRecord
Martinez wrote for Division Seven upholding Los Angeles's Eviction Threshold Ordinance (no nonpayment eviction until a tenant owes more than one month's fair market rent) against Unlawful Detainer Act preemption, while striking the city's Relocation Assistance Ordinance as preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Act.
Eviction threshold: a substantive defense ('a substantive defense with an impact on timing,' quoting SFAA 2018), not a procedural barrier, so it is within the city's police power; distinguishes the notice-and-cure rules struck in Pasadena (2025) and SFAA (2024).
Expressly reserves whether a city may eliminate nonpayment as a ground for eviction: 'is not before us.'
Relocation assistance (three months' fair market rent when a tenant leaves after a large lawful rent increase): 'financially penalizes landlords' for rights Costa-Hawkins grants and is not saved by the 'basis for eviction' clause; the city conceded this under Pasadena.
Rejects intervenors' argument that Pasadena misapplied Riverside, relying on Chevron v. County of Monterey (2023). The relocation part (D) was later left unpublished.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Apartment Assn. of Los Angeles County v. City of Los Angeles, B336071
AAGLA argues the threshold is 'a proxy for an extension of the time provided by the unlawful detainer statute.'
The City, intervenors, and San Francisco and Santa Monica as amici argue the ordinance creates a substantive just-cause defense.
Intervenors argue Pasadena was wrongly decided; the City argues Pasadena implicitly sets the Tenant Protection Act against Costa-Hawkins.
Limits: One opinion, joined unanimously. It follows the division's own Pasadena precedent on relocation assistance. Later Supreme Court action is not in this document.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7court opinionRecord
Presiding Justice Martinez's opinion for a unanimous Division Seven panel ordering Los Angeles County to bargain with the Professional Peace Officers Association before outsourcing security work at the Hall of Administration. A union's waiver of statutory bargaining rights must be 'clear and unmistakable', and the MOU's clause that management need not negotiate 'any reorganization' was too vague to waive bargaining over contracting out.
Under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, outsourcing that adversely affects a bargaining unit is a mandatory bargaining subject; the County bore the burden to prove waiver.
The MOU's notice provisions on transfer of functions say nothing about the bargaining right, so they waive nothing.
The 'any reorganization' clause is 'vague and ambiguous' and can reasonably be read to preserve only core management decisions such as layoffs; general management-rights clauses preserve prerogatives rather than waive bargaining rights.
Reverses a trial court and the County's labor commission (ERCOM), both of which had relied on dictionary definitions of 'reorganization.'
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
L.A. County Professional Peace Officers Assn. v. County of Los Angeles, B338182 (L.A. Super. Ct. No. 23STCP00398)
Outcome
Reversed and remanded with directions to issue a writ requiring the County to meet and confer
Panel
Martinez, P.J.; Feuer, J., and Stone, J., concurring
Publication
Filed unpublished 2026-03-13; certified for publication 2026-04-10
The County argued the MOU's 'any reorganization' clause and its focus on transfer of functions plainly covered outsourcing; the court rejected this.
PPOA argued 'reorganization' is conceptually different from contracting out work; the court found that a reasonable reading.
Limits: A contract-interpretation case on one MOU clause; it decides only that bargaining is required, not the merits of outsourcing.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7court opinionRecord
Presiding Justice Martinez's opinion for a unanimous panel affirming a judgment that set aside Los Angeles County's approval of Tejon Ranch's Centennial project, about 19,333 homes on 12,000 acres in the Antelope Valley. The published part holds the environmental impact report was prejudicially misleading because it counted energy suppliers' cap-and-trade compliance as offsetting 96 percent of the project's emissions. The unpublished part also finds the off-site wildfire analysis inadequate but rejects the environmental groups' cross-appeal on wildlife, native plants, and alternatives.
The project is not a covered entity under cap-and-trade; CEQA Guidelines section 15126.4(c)(3) allows only offsets 'not otherwise required', so suppliers' mandatory compliance cannot be double-counted as project mitigation.
Distinguishes Association of Irritated Residents (2017), where the project site itself (a refinery) was a covered entity; at oral argument Tejon did not ask the court to uphold that case and conceded a key emissions table was misleading.
Gives weight to the Natural Resources Agency's 2009 statement of reasons and a CARB comment letter saying cap-and-trade was not meant to mitigate land-use projects.
Unpublished part: the one-paragraph off-site wildfire discussion was inadequate; the Center could share in relief won by Climate Resolve, which settled; but the EIR's wildlife, vegetation, and alternatives analyses were adequate.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Center for Biological Diversity v. County of Los Angeles, B330610 (L.A. Super. Ct. No. 19STCP02100)
Outcome
Judgment affirmed on appeal and cross-appeal; parties bear own costs
Panel
Martinez, P.J.; Feuer, J., and Stone, J., concurring
Project
Centennial Specific Plan: 19,333 units, about 12,323 acres, 157,642 metric tons per year estimated emissions
Publication
Partial: parts I.D-E and II of the Discussion unpublished
Tejon argued the County could apply cap-and-trade under the AIR decision and that the EIR claimed no mitigation credit; the court disagreed.
CARB's executive officer wrote that the cap-and-trade program 'simply does not cover' the project.
Amici including Californians for Homeownership and Climate Resolve supported Tejon.
Limits: Decides whether the EIR complied with CEQA, not whether the project should be built. Very long; read selectively (introduction, greenhouse-gas holding, wildfire and cross-appeal conclusions).
Long document: only the first 60,000 characters were summarized.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7court opinionRecord
A second order modifying footnote 3 of Presiding Justice Martinez's April 21, 2025 opinion in Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, with the unmodified opinion attached. The opinion holds that revocable, prospective written waivers of the meal period for five-to-six-hour shifts are enforceable absent evidence of unconscionability or coercion. The order adds that the two possibly applicable wage orders are identical on meal periods, so the court need not decide which applies.
Second modification replaces footnote 3 again, now stating both wage orders cover veterinary technicians and have identical meal-period terms; no change in judgment.
Holding and reasoning are the same as in the opinion attached to the first modification order: text silent on timing, history supports prospective waivers, Brinker and the 2003 DLSE letter do not control.
The court notes plaintiffs did not claim the waivers were unknowing, coerced, or irrevocable, and reserves those questions.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, Inc., B322799
Outcome
Judgment for the employer affirmed
Document
Second modification order (May 21, 2025) plus the April 21, 2025 opinion
Plaintiffs relied on Brinker and a DLSE opinion letter; the court found neither controlling.
Limits: Substantively a duplicate of the May 20, 2025 document: the same opinion with a corrected footnote.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7court opinionRecord
An order modifying a footnote in Presiding Justice Martinez's April 21, 2025 opinion in Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating, with the unmodified opinion attached. The opinion, for a unanimous panel, holds that a revocable written waiver signed in advance can waive the meal period for shifts of five to six hours, absent evidence it was unconscionable or coercive.
The order corrects footnote 3, which had swapped which wage order covers which industry; no change in judgment.
Labor Code section 512 and Wage Orders 4 and 5 are silent on the timing and form of a waiver; because the text supports both readings, the court turns to legislative and administrative history.
IWC history shows written prospective waivers were adopted elsewhere as protections for both sides, not a bar on prospective waivers.
Brinker (2012) did not address when a meal period may be waived; a 2003 DLSE opinion letter on an agricultural wage order does not control.
The court says it 'would hesitate' to uphold a waiver that was coerced, unknowing, or not freely revocable; plaintiffs made no such claims.
Martinez, P.J.; Feuer, J., and Stone, J., concurring
Document
First modification order (May 20, 2025) plus the April 21, 2025 opinion
Plaintiffs argued prospective waivers let employers circumvent meal-break rights; the court found the text and history do not support this.
Vicar argued the statute and wage orders place no limits on the timing of waivers.
Limits: Same opinion as the second modification order filed May 21, 2025; one question of first impression on stipulated facts. The opinion reserves the question of coerced or non-revocable waivers.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7court opinionRecord
Presiding Justice Martinez's opinion for a unanimous panel, here with a March 27, 2025 order modifying it and denying rehearing. Two charities won trial-court rulings that parts of California's charitable-solicitation law were unconstitutional prior restraints, plus statewide injunctions against the Attorney General. The court vacates the injunctions because the charities never pleaded or proved a right to them, and affirms the trial court's reformation and severance of the cease-and-desist provision.
The Attorney General did not challenge the constitutional rulings, only the injunctions; the court holds permanent injunctions 'are not issued as a matter of course, even in cases implicating the First Amendment.'
The charities' complaints did not request injunctive relief; on remand the trial court decides whether to allow amendment and whether an injunction is proven.
No categorical bar on both reforming and severing a statute (Kopp); the charities did not show the Legislature would prefer invalidation.
Attorney fee awards to the charities vacated for reconsideration; the modification deletes the words ', and we reject it' from one sentence about injunctions reaching nonparties.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. v. Bonta, B315409 (consol.), with Food for the Poor, Inc. v. Bonta, B315416 (L.A. Super. Ct. Nos. 20STCP01520, 20STCP01626)
Outcome
Injunctions vacated and remanded; reformation affirmed; fee awards vacated; parties bear own costs
Panel
Martinez, P.J.; Segal, J., and Stone, J., concurring
Statute
Supervision of Trustees and Fundraisers for Charitable Purposes Act, Gov. Code § 12580 et seq.; § 12591.1(b) cease-and-desist power added by AB 2327 (2012)
The charities argued, and the trial court agreed, that an 'injunction goes hand in hand with First Amendment cases'; the appellate court disagreed.
The charities argued a court cannot both reform and sever a statute; the court found no such rule.
Limits: Does not review the trial court's First Amendment rulings, which the Attorney General did not appeal. Long; read selectively (introduction, injunction and reformation holdings, disposition).
Long document: only the first 30,000 characters were summarized.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Courthouse News reports that a Division Seven panel led by Martinez upheld the rejection of Tejon Ranch's 12,000-acre Centennial development, holding that Los Angeles County misused California's cap-and-trade program to count away 96% of the project's greenhouse gas emissions.
Quotes Martinez's opinion: the county 'failed to proceed in a manner required by law when it applied the cap-and-trade program' to the project's emissions, rendering the EIR 'prejudicially misleading.'
The court held CEQA guidelines contain an 'additionality requirement' barring use of energy providers' cap-and-trade compliance to offset a land-use project.
The court upheld the trial court's rejection of the environmental groups' claims on wildlife, vegetation, and alternatives.
Joined by Justices Natalie Stone and Gail Feuer.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Center for Biological Diversity v. County of Los Angeles (Centennial project)
Project
About 20,000 homes and 10 million sq. ft. of commercial space
Emissions at issue
About 157,000 tons a year; county claimed 96% covered by cap-and-trade
The Center for Biological Diversity calls the ruling 'a victory for Los Angeles and California'.
Developer counsel Jennifer Hernandez said at argument the county never claimed cap-and-trade was a mitigation requirement.
Limits: News report quoting two sentences of the opinion; the opinion itself is not in this collection.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Bay Area Reporter coverage of Martinez's unanimous confirmation as Division Seven's presiding justice. It reports his JNE rating of 'well qualified', anonymous jurists' praise mixed with concern about his limited appellate experience, and his own remarks on judging.
Commission on Judicial Appointments confirmed him 3-0 on May 14, 2024, less than a year after he joined the appellate bench.
Of 13 people the Attorney General's office contacted, none objected; two jurists said his short tenure and the division's case backlog could make the presiding role challenging at first.
Martinez, quoted: 'I will pause and think about whether what I am doing is the right thing under the circumstances and the law.'
Supporters, including Ana Matosantos and 15 bar associations, described him as 'measured, matter of fact, collaborative, and insightful.'
Facts, claims & caveats
Rating
Well qualified (Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation), presiding justice
Vote
3-0, Commission on Judicial Appointments, May 14, 2024
Bar admission
June 1, 2004
One unnamed jurist said Martinez 'is new and still learning his role as appellate justice'.
Another jurist praised his 'strong work ethic' but noted 'very little experience as a justice'.
Gregg M. Adam called him 'unflappable' and said 'He displays the utmost integrity.'
Limits: Confirmation coverage from 2024; predates nearly all of his presiding-justice record and quotes mostly supporters.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Courts of Appeal, Second DistrictotherNeutral
The court's biography says Martinez has been Presiding Justice of Division Seven since 2024, after a year as its associate justice; earlier he was Gov. Newsom's deputy judicial appointments secretary, a deputy solicitor general, and an appellate partner at Squire Patton Boggs.
Associate Justice, Division Seven, 2023-2024; confirmed Presiding Justice in 2024.
Worked in the Governor's Office as deputy judicial appointments secretary and in legal affairs.
As deputy solicitor general, represented the state in the U.S. and California Supreme Courts.
Certified appellate specialist; elected to the American Law Institute in 2025.
Facts, claims & caveats
Education
Harvard College A.B. (magna cum laude); Harvard Law School; M.A. English, Stanford
Clerkships
Judge Maxine M. Chesney (N.D. Cal.); Judge Anthony W. Ishii (E.D. Cal.)