judge10 sources, dated 2023-04-17 – 2026-07-30· last searched 2026-10-29
Associate Justice, Second District, Division Four
Overview
Synthesized 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session from 10 sources dated 2023-04-17 to 2026-07-30. Machine-written; numbers link to the sources below.
Mori has sat on Division Four since April 2023, after five years on the LA Superior Court (civil and family law) and a career as an intellectual-property and commercial litigator, mostly at Perkins Coie 10,7. The court's profile reports an "exceptionally well qualified" JNE rating 10. From October 2024 to October 2026 she authored 5 published opinions in 4 cases, with no dissents or concurrences 8. Results ran different ways: a business kept its California jury right against an accounting firm's out-of-state forum clause 6; a State Bar rule survived an equal protection challenge 4,3; a trial court could not resentence a death-row defendant while his Supreme Court appeal is pending 2; and the Coastal Act required Redondo Beach to deny a builder's-remedy housing project 1. The only commentary in our sources, one appellate blogger, praised the Comedy Store opinion 5.
Record
Published-opinion census, Oct. 2024 to Oct. 2026: 5 authored (4 distinct cases), 0 dissents or concurrences; published opinions only.8
July 30, 2026, New Commune DTLA v. Redondo Beach (as Acting Presiding Justice): affirmed denial of a 30-unit builder's-remedy project in a coastal zone; a city may not approve uses its certified Local Coastal Program does not allow.1
Sept. 11, 2025, People v. Millsap: no section 1172.75 resentencing while a capital judgment is on automatic appeal; the absence error was harmless.2
June 26, 2025, Getzels v. State Bar: upheld Rule 2.30 under rational basis review; on July 24, 2025 the panel narrowed one footnote and denied rehearing.4,3
Nov. 14, 2024, Comedy Store v. Moss Adams: reversed dismissal; the drafting party bears the burden of showing a jury right survives an out-of-state forum, and a one-sided stipulation does not meet it.6
Confirmed unanimously to Division Four on April 17, 2023.7
Stated positions
In her opinions (2024-26): freedom of contract is not a fundamental right; courts may not rewrite statutes or contracts; changes to coastal and housing law are for the Legislature.6,4,1
Praise & support
Rated "exceptionally well qualified" by the JNE Commission, per the court's profile. — California Courts of Appeal10
The Comedy Store opinion makes "quite a few doctrinal moves" and "Justice Mori pulls them all"; its closing paragraph on incentives is "Spot on right." — Shaun Martin, California Appellate Report5
What we could not find
No criticism of her or retention recommendations in our sources.
No dissents or concurrences, so the sample shows no view she held apart from her panel.
Unpublished opinions, the bulk of appellate work, are not covered.
No record from her Superior Court years and no statements in her own words outside opinions.
Questions to consider
Has the Supreme Court reviewed Millsap or New Commune, which touch on capital jurisdiction and housing policy?
How do her unpublished criminal decisions compare with Millsap?
Do voter-guide publishers take a position on her retention?
Analysis of their legal writing and words
Written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session from 4 primary texts1,2,3,6. An evaluative machine reading: check each point against its quoted evidence.
Coverage: Five texts chosen by the fixed sampling rule (all separate opinions, newest first, up to 3, then the most recent authored opinions, up to 5 total): 0 separate opinions (she wrote none in the period) and all 5 of her authored published opinions, Nov. 2024 to July 2026. They cover four distinct cases, since S3 is the modification order for S4 (Getzels): housing law against the Coastal Act (S1, New Commune), capital-case resentencing jurisdiction (S2, Millsap), an equal protection challenge to a State Bar rule (S4), and a forum clause paired with a jury waiver (S5, Comedy Store). Three civil, one criminal; all unanimous. No speeches or interviews.
Text and structure first, then canons. Where a statute is silent she uses constitutional avoidance and the statute's purpose (S2) and reads related schemes together so that neither is defeated (S1). She applies the conventional tiers of scrutiny, using rational basis for professional regulation and rejecting Lochner-era freedom-of-contract claims (S4). She defers to the Legislature on policy, leaving changes to coastal or housing law to it (S1), and protects the Supreme Court's exclusive capital jurisdiction (S2). Claimants fared differently by claim: the jury-trial right prevailed against the drafting party (S5), while the developer, the capital defendant, and the inactive bar licensee lost (S1, S2, S4). No ideological label is supported.
In their words: Opinions do not describe the author. The closest statement is about the court's role: 'We may not rewrite the law as Developer requests.' (S1).
Articulation: StrongConsistency: Not enough evidence
Articulation. Prepared texts only. Each opinion frames the competing schemes or tests before applying them, and she engages the losing side's proposal on its own terms, for example testing the developer's 'objective policy' standard against the statutory definition and finding it 'unworkable' (S1). Practical reasoning is specific ('We question whether a trial court can make this type of risk assessment from a criminal history that is nonfinal, currently disputed, and subject to material change by the Supreme Court.', S2). Small citation and date slips: S2 gives the notice-of-appeal deadline as 'February 13, 2023' for a 2024 date; S4 cites Hardin as '318 Cal.5th'. S3 refines an imprecise footnote in S4 after a rehearing petition.
Consistency. Four distinct cases on unrelated subjects give no repeated issue to compare over time. Method is steady across them: text and statutory structure first, purpose and avoidance canons when text is silent (S1, S2). She applies preservation rules with discretion: S4 reaches a constitutional argument raised first on appeal, while S5 refuses one first raised at oral argument. S3 narrows, rather than reverses, the S4 footnote. No shifts found.
Positions
Builder's-remedy housing in the coastal zone: A Commission-certified Local Coastal Program embodies state law; a city may not approve a use the LCP does not permit, even under the Housing Accountability Act's builder's remedy.
“We recognize the friction in this conclusion and the HAA’s laudable goal of providing affordable housing, but to adopt the construction proposed by Developer would effectively repeal Coastal Act procedures mandating Commission oversight.”12026-07-30
Resentencing while a death-penalty appeal is pending: The capital judgment is indivisible and within the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction, so a trial court may not conduct section 1172.75 resentencing in the meantime.
“We conclude the capital judgment over which the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction is indivisible and includes convictions and sentences for noncapital as well as capital offenses.”22025-09-11
“Resentencing in this type of case would not further these purposes or the intent underlying section 1172.75.”22025-09-11
Freedom of contract and professional regulation: Freedom of contract is not a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny; the State Bar may rationally bar inactive licensees from serving as private neutrals.
“In contending “the freedom of contract” is a fundamental right and strict scrutiny applies to his claim, Getzels relies on overruled and repudiated case law.”32025-06-26
“It is rational to conclude that licensees who act as private arbitrators and mediators should be required to continue paying active annual licensee fees, whereas those who have distanced themselves from the practice of law should not.”32025-06-26
Predispute jury waivers and out-of-state forum clauses: The party enforcing the forum clause bears the burden of showing the jury right survives elsewhere; a one-sided promise not to enforce the waiver does not meet it.
“It was Moss Adams’s burden to show the Store’s right to a jury trial would not be diminished, so any doubt about the jury trial waiver’s enforceability must be resolved against Moss Adams.”62024-11-14
Stated principles (3)
Policy changes belong to the Legislature, not the court.
“We may not rewrite the law as Developer requests.”12026-07-30
“Legislature may choose to curtail Coastal Act requirements after hearing from interested stakeholders beyond the parties before us.”12026-07-30
Weigh practical consequences and incentives a ruling creates.
“If we were to hold that Moss Adams’s unilateral stipulation satisfied its burden of proof under Verdugo, it would have little incentive to take the jury waiver out of the agreements it provides to California clients.”62024-11-14
“If the Court affirms any of defendant’s eight death sentences, the resentencing done by the trial court may be for naught.”22025-09-11
Rational basis review is deferential and needs no empirical proof.
“The State Bar was motivated by concerns that complaints about licensees might burden its regulatory system, and such concerns need not be empirically substantiated.”32025-06-26
Notable rhetoric
Restrained tone; criticism of litigants is limited and specific, such as reliance on 'overruled and repudiated case law' (S4).
Acknowledges costs of her own holdings: 'the friction in this conclusion and the HAA’s laudable goal of providing affordable housing' (S1).
Explains when she will reach a forfeitable issue: 'Because Getzels’s claim involves a facial constitutional challenge presenting a pure question of law, and because the parties have fully briefed and argued the issue, we will consider it on the merits.' (S4).
Limits: Published opinions are a minority of a justice's work; most decisions are unpublished, and opinions she joined but did not write are excluded. Two of the five texts are one case, so the sample shows four decisions. Opinions are panel products, and the text may not be hers alone.
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California Secretary of Stateofficial analysisNeutral
The Secretary of State's official guide lists Audra M. Mori, Associate Justice, Division Four, among the Second District justices on the retention ballot. Names and divisions only, each linked to the court's biography.
Mori is listed under Division Four with Presiding Justice Helen Zukin and Justices Nicholas Daum and Armen Tamzarian.
No qualifications, ratings, or arguments appear on this page.
Facts, claims & caveats
Ballot listing
Audra M. Mori, Associate Justice, Second District, Division Four
Limits: A list only; it says nothing about the justice's record.
California Appellate Report (blog)third party analysisSupports
A short post on the California Appellate Report blog praises Mori's Comedy Store opinion: the author writes that it takes "quite a few doctrinal moves" and "Justice Mori pulls them all," and quotes her closing paragraph on incentives as "Spot on right."
Explains the holding in a sentence: a forum clause bundled with a jury waiver unenforceable in California does not justify dismissal, even with a stipulation.
Quotes the opinion's paragraph on predispute jury waivers at length.
Facts, claims & caveats
Author
Shaun Martin
Opinion discussed
The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams (Nov. 14, 2024)
Shaun Martin writes that the equity of the result is best expressed in Mori's closing paragraph, calling it correct.
Limits: One commentator's brief reaction to one opinion.
Judicial Branch of Californiadecision recordRecord
Census of Mori's published opinions, Oct. 2024 to Oct. 2026, from courts.ca.gov listings: 5 authored, 0 dissents or concurrences. Two entries are one case (Getzels, original and modification), so four distinct cases: three civil, one criminal.
5 authored published opinions (4 distinct cases); 0 separate opinions.
Cases: New Commune DTLA v. Redondo Beach (housing vs. Coastal Act, 2026), People v. Millsap (capital resentencing jurisdiction, 2025), Getzels v. State Bar (equal protection, 2025), Comedy Store v. Moss Adams (forum clause and jury waiver, 2024).
Covers published opinions only; most appellate decisions are unpublished.
Facts, claims & caveats
Authored published opinions
5 (4 distinct cases)
Dissents/concurrences
0
Period
October 2024 to October 2026
Authorship was read from each opinion's signature block, according to the listing.
Limits: Published opinions only, and only those she signed as author; it omits unpublished opinions and opinions she joined.
Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4court opinionRecord
Opinion by Mori as Acting Presiding Justice (Tamzarian, Cogliati concurring) upholding Redondo Beach's refusal of a 30-unit 'builder's remedy' condo project in a coastal zone its certified Local Coastal Program reserves for public access and recreation. Even assuming the Housing Accountability Act's builder's remedy applies, the Coastal Act required denial, and no feasible compliant path existed because the developer skipped the amendment process.
Rejects the developer's proposal to allow denials only under 'specific, objective' Coastal Act policies as 'unworkable,' since nearly all the cited policies call for subjective judgment the Act assigns to the Coastal Commission.
A certified LCP embodies state policy, not just local law; a city cannot approve a use the LCP does not permit without a Commission-certified amendment.
Borrows CEQA case law on 'feasible' to hold that the City need not analyze a legally infeasible alternative.
Acknowledges 'the friction in this conclusion and the HAA's laudable goal of providing affordable housing' and leaves any change to the Legislature.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
New Commune DTLA LLC v. City of Redondo Beach, B337897
Outcome
Judgment denying writ petition affirmed
Project
30 condominiums, 6 affordable, about 141,000 sq ft, in the CC-4 coastal zone
Panel
Mori, Acting P. J. (author); Tamzarian, J.; Cogliati, J. (Santa Cruz Superior Court, by assignment)
The court says adopting the developer's reading 'would effectively repeal Coastal Act procedures mandating Commission oversight.'
The City argued the developer's proposal would lead to 'cherry-picking' Coastal Act policies; the court calls that argument persuasive.
Limits: Assumes without deciding that the builder's remedy applies; one coastal-zone housing dispute. Says nothing about further review.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Fourcourt opinionRecord
Mori's published opinion holds that a trial court may not resentence a death-row defendant under Penal Code section 1172.75 (which invalidated most prior-prison-term enhancements) while his automatic appeal is pending in the Supreme Court, because that court's exclusive jurisdiction covers the whole judgment, noncapital counts included. Any error in holding the hearing without the defendant was harmless.
Defendant Bruce Millsap faces eight death sentences plus more than 100 years to life; the challenged enhancement was a one-year prison prior.
Construes the statute narrowly to avoid a conflict with the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisdiction (Cal. Const., art. VI, section 11).
Reasons that resentencing would not serve the statute's purpose of reducing incarceration while eight death sentences stand.
Distinguishes Velasco and parts ways in reasoning with Division Seven's Dixon decision, which allowed partial resentencing but did not address exclusive jurisdiction.
Assumes without deciding that the right to be present was violated and finds no prejudice.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
People v. Millsap, B336859 (2d Dist., Div. 4), published
Author
Mori, J.; Zukin, P. J., and Garcia Uhrig, J., concurring
Disposition
Postjudgment order affirmed
Holding
A capital judgment on automatic appeal is indivisible for section 1172.75 resentencing
Defendant argued section 1172.75 vested resentencing jurisdiction in the trial court despite the pending appeal.
The Attorney General argued Velasco was inapposite because it was not a capital case; the court agreed.
Limits: Narrow jurisdictional ruling; the opinion notes resentencing may follow after the Supreme Court decides the appeal.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4court opinionRecord
Order by the Mori panel modifying the June 26, 2025 Getzels v. State Bar opinion and otherwise denying rehearing, with the unmodified opinion attached. It narrows footnote 12: the Contract Clause argument raised only in reply is forfeited, and Spannaus does not support strict scrutiny.
Rewrites footnote 12 to separate a forfeited Contract Clause challenge from the citation of Spannaus for strict scrutiny.
Rehearing otherwise denied; no change in judgment.
The attached opinion (by Mori) applies rational basis review and upholds State Bar Rule 2.30, which bars inactive licensees from serving as private arbitrators or mediators.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Getzels v. State Bar of California, B338089
Order
Opinion modified, rehearing denied, no change in judgment
Rehearing petition filed
2025-07-11
Limits: A one-footnote change to an opinion already in our sources. The stored panel line is garbled ('MORI, J. MORI, J. J. DAUM').
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Fourcourt opinionRecord
Mori's published opinion rejects an equal protection challenge to State Bar Rule 2.30, which bars inactive bar licensees from working as private arbitrators or mediators. Rational basis review applies, and the State Bar could rationally require those who do law-related work to pay active fees because they may burden its disciplinary system.
Rejects the claim that "freedom of contract" is a fundamental right, noting the plaintiff relied on overruled Lochner-era cases.
Relies on a 2005 State Bar staff report explaining why private neutrals should pay active fees.
Distinguishes Cleburne's more searching review as reserved for laws motivated by prejudice against an unpopular group.
Considers a constitutional argument raised for the first time on appeal; treats a Contract Clause argument raised only in reply as forfeited.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Getzels v. The State Bar of California, B338089 (2d Dist., Div. 4), published
Author
Mori, J.; Zukin, P. J., and Daum, J., concurring
Disposition
Judgment of dismissal affirmed
Plaintiff
Morris S. Getzels, 72, an arbitrator and mediator for more than 25 years
Getzels argued the rule singles out inactive licensees from "the entire world" and lacks any rational basis.
The State Bar argued the rule serves a legitimate interest because inactive licensees remain subject to its discipline.
Limits: Decided on demurrer under a deferential standard; it does not assess whether the rule is good policy.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Fourcourt opinionRecord
Mori's published opinion reverses dismissal of the Comedy Store's suit against accounting firm Moss Adams. Because the contract paired a Washington forum clause with a predispute jury waiver (unenforceable in California, enforceable in Washington), Moss Adams bore the burden of showing the Store's jury right would survive in Washington, and its one-sided stipulation not to enforce the waiver did not meet it.
Holds the trial court wrongly placed the burden of proof on the Store.
Finds Moss Adams cited no case in which a Washington court refused to enforce a jury waiver.
Treats the unsigned stipulation as an unaccepted offer that a court cannot turn into a contract modification.
Follows Division Seven's Lathrop and warns that accepting such stipulations would leave companies little incentive to remove unenforceable terms.
Deems waived an argument raised first at oral argument.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP, B327404 (2d Dist., Div. 4), certified for publication
Author
Mori, J.; Collins, Acting P. J., and Zukin, J., concurring
Disposition
Reversed with directions to deny the motion
Claim
Alleged loss of an $8.5 million Shuttered Venue Operator Grant
Moss Adams argued its stipulation was an enforceable contract and that judicial estoppel would bind it in Washington.
Limits: The stored text says nothing about later history. Reversed on the burden of proof alone; the court did not reach the Store's other arguments.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Judicial Council news release: the Commission on Judicial Appointments unanimously confirmed Mori to Division Four on April 17, 2023, filling the seat of retired Justice Thomas Willhite. Gives her career dates.
Confirmed by unanimous vote of Chief Justice Guerrero, Attorney General Bonta, and Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert.
Career: Superior Court judge since 2018; Perkins Coie partner 2005-2018 and Los Angeles managing partner 2017-2018; earlier at Piper Rudnick, Preston Gates and Ellis, Andrews Kurth, and Brobeck; law clerk at the U.S. Court of International Trade 1994-1996.
Facts, claims & caveats
Confirmation
April 17, 2023, unanimous
Vacancy
Retirement of Justice Thomas Willhite
Limits: Announcement only; no evaluation of her work.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Courts of Appeal, Second Appellate DistrictotherNeutral
The court's official profile: appointed to Division Four in 2023 by Gov. Newsom after serving on the Los Angeles Superior Court since 2018 (civil and family law). Before that, an intellectual property and commercial litigator, mostly at Perkins Coie, where she was managing partner of an office.
Appointed to the Superior Court in 2018 by Gov. Brown; chaired the court's Judicial Mentor Program.
Unanimously confirmed after an "exceptionally well qualified" rating from the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation, per the profile.
Clerked for Judge Richard W. Goldberg of the U.S. Court of International Trade.
Described as the first woman of color to serve as managing partner of a Perkins Coie office; chaired its global Diversity Committee.
Past president of the Japanese American Bar Association; serves on the LA County Bar Litigation Section executive committee.
Facts, claims & caveats
Court
Second Appellate District, Division Four, since 2023
JNE rating
Exceptionally well qualified
Superior Court appointment
2018, Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr.
Education
BA, UCLA; JD, Cornell Law School
The court's profile reports the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation rated her "exceptionally well qualified."
Limits: Self-published court biography; it describes career history, not the quality of her decisions.
Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.