judge19 sources, dated 2025-11-17 – 2026-10-14· last searched 2026-10-29
Associate Justice, Second District, Division Eight
Overview
Synthesized 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session from 13 sources dated 2025-11-17 to 2026-10-14. Machine-written; numbers link to the sources below.
Scherb joined Division Eight in November 2025 after a career as an appellate staff attorney, a Los Angeles city appellate lawyer and a Supreme Court chambers attorney. He had not been a judge before 18,9. The census lists 3 authored published opinions and no separate opinions from October 2024 to October 2026 19. They are a criminal resentencing ruling for the prosecution (May 2026) 7, a $10.5 million judgment extended to a tenant's family partners (July 2026) 6, and a 2-1 holding that an employee waived the federal Ending Forced Arbitration Act (October 2026), over Wiley's dissent 3. LAist lists a State Bar rating of "Well qualified" 4. Reform California says do not retain 12. A blog says retain 2. DSA-LA says voters could vote no because of his corporate-law background 1.
Record
Census, Oct 2024 to Oct 2026: 3 authored published opinions, 0 separate opinions. Published opinions only.19
Oct 5, 2026, Chin v. DoorDash: wrote the 2-1 majority holding an employee waived the EFAA by strategically withholding a known harassment claim; arbitration compelled.3
Jul 23, 2026, 8451 Melrose Property v. Akhtarzad: affirmed adding an undisclosed family partnership's members and company to a commercial-lease judgment.6
May 4, 2026, People v. Moss: held an upper term may be reimposed at section 1172.75 resentencing without new jury findings, joining most appellate courts against Gonzalez; the Supreme Court is reviewing the issue.7,8
Statutory rights such as the EFAA are presumptively waivable, and withholding known objections is "unbecoming gamesmanship" (Oct 2026).3
A resentencing proviso creates two rules; the contrary reading is "counter textual" (May 2026).7
Praise & support
Found no scandals or discipline; retain. — Daniel Faigin (cahighways.org)2
Varied expertise on the court is valuable. — DSA-LA1
Criticism & concerns
Do not retain (no reason given). — Reform California12
Voters could vote no because he was a corporate-law partner. — DSA-LA1
Where sources disagree
DSA-LA calls him a former corporate-law partner; the court biography and the Judicial Council describe litigation practice at Winston & Strawn, and the Council calls him an associate.1,18,9
LAist dates his "Well qualified" rating to 2024, before his 2025 nomination as other sources give it.4,18
What we could not find
Only three published opinions and no separate opinions; his record is short.
No interviews, questionnaire answers or speeches.
Unpublished opinions, most of his work, are not covered; a blog's claim about one is AI-sourced and unverified.
Questions to consider
How does his short record compare with the State Bar's evaluation, and when was that evaluation done?
Will the Supreme Court's Eaton review affect his Moss holding?
How does his waiver analysis in Chin compare with other courts applying the EFAA?
Analysis of their legal writing and words
Written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session from 3 primary texts3,6,7. An evaluative machine reading: check each point against its quoted evidence.
Coverage: Systematic sample per the fixed rule: separate opinions first (he has none), then his newest authored opinions, up to 5 texts. Only 3 exist, so the sample is his complete published output for Oct 2024 to Oct 2026 per the census. S1 Chin v. DoorDash (employment arbitration, majority over a Wiley dissent), S2 8451 Melrose Property v. Akhtarzad (adding judgment debtors), S3 People v. Moss (criminal resentencing), May to October 2026. S1's text includes Wiley's dissent; only the majority is treated as Scherb's words. S2 was read selectively (framework, due-process and individual-partner sections). Prepared written opinions only; no speeches, interviews or questionnaires.
Text- and precedent-driven, with close attention to structure. In S3 he reads a statutory proviso as setting two rules and joins most appellate courts against a contrary decision. He also accepts that the Legislature may limit how far ameliorative relief reaches. In S1 he treats a federal statutory right as waivable under ordinary default rules unless Congress says otherwise. He requires clear and convincing evidence of waiver, which he finds in the plaintiff's own statements. In S2 he works through Supreme Court due-process precedent on binding absent partners and holds the facts sufficient, declining to announce broader rules. He tends to decide no more than needed: S1 skips the pleading issue and S3 assumes the claim was not forfeited. Results: for the employer (S1), the judgment creditor (S2) and the prosecution (S3). Three opinions are too few to describe a settled philosophy.
In their words: insufficient_evidence: the opinions contain no self-description.
Articulation: AdequateConsistency: Not enough evidence
Articulation. Prepared texts only. S1 and S2 are thorough and well organized. They state the standard of review and quantum of proof, survey authority on both sides (S1 distinguishes Ding and Quilala; S2 works through Dillard, Minton and Sawyer), and answer the losing side's arguments. Clear examples are the opening one-sentence statement of the holding in S1 and the explicit road map in S2. S3 is short and leans on other courts' reasoning instead of developing its own. S2 is dense and citation-heavy, and harder for a lay reader. With three samples, adequate is the supportable rating, though S1 and S2 approach strong.
Consistency. Three majority opinions over five months show a consistent method: careful text and precedent, and narrow holdings. That is too few, and too short a span, to judge consistency over time. No shifts are observable.
Positions
Waiver of statutory rights in litigation: Statutory rights, including the federal Ending Forced Arbitration Act, are presumptively waivable. Strategically withholding a known claim while opposing arbitration waives the Act's protection.
“The EFAA does not automatically void arbitration agreements.”32026-10-05
“It constitutes waiver by clear and convincing evidence.”32026-10-05
“It would be problematic if litigants, without restrictions, could strategically delay invocation of the EFAA by strategically delaying their presentation of harassment claims such as those Chin has injected here.”32026-10-05
Litigation gamesmanship: Parties must raise known objections to arbitration in court before arbitration proceeds.
“Sandbagging the court and litigation opponents by withholding known objections causes disorder and waste, and it represents unbecoming gamesmanship.”32026-10-05
Adding judgment debtors under section 187: Undisclosed partners can be added to a judgment when the partnership was the real defendant and the partners, on the totality of circumstances, controlled the litigation. Due process limits this, and the opinion addresses those limits at length.
“In sum, section 187 liability follows from a nonparty’s sufficient litigation control and sufficient relationship to a judgment debtor.”62026-07-23
“The expectation of partners in partnership is liability.”62026-07-23
Upper terms at section 1172.75 resentencing: An upper term properly imposed originally may be reimposed without new jury findings. The contrary reading in Gonzalez is rejected.
“Similarly, constitutional and statutory rights are presumptively waivable.”32026-10-05
Decide narrowly on the facts presented.
“Finding waiver, we need not address DoorDash’s argument that Chin did not proffer a sexual harassment claim sufficient to unlock the EFAA’s protections.”32026-10-05
“In light of this, but without delineating further rules on the topic, we conclude the evidence supports the trial court’s”62026-07-23
Notable rhetoric
S1 calls the plaintiff's conduct "unbecoming gamesmanship" and "Sandbagging", and rejects a claimed "right to forum shop" to the extent it means to "forum hop at whim."
S1 fills the gap on an unbriefed point by assumption, noting the parties "did not brief what quantum of proof" applies, and applies the stricter clear-and-convincing standard.
S3 openly notes the Supreme Court is reviewing the same question (People v. Eaton) and follows the majority of appellate courts in the meantime.
Limits: Only three published opinions, all majorities, from May to October 2026. Published opinions are a minority of a justice's work; most appeals are decided in unpublished opinions, which this sample does not cover. There are no separate opinions, so his views where he disagrees with colleagues are unknown. No unscripted speech; joined opinions are not covered. S2 was read selectively.
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A personal blog's ballot analysis, relying explicitly on "Google AI" answers, says it found no scandals or discipline involving Scherb and concludes "Retain (Yes)."
Notes he was appointed directly to the appellate court without prior trial-court service.
Says he was unanimously confirmed in November 2025 to fill Justice Elizabeth Grimes's vacancy.
Facts, claims & caveats
Conclusion
Retain (Yes)
Confirmed
November 2025, unanimous (per blog)
The blogger, citing Google AI, says Scherb's record contains no ethical scandals, misconduct investigations or disciplinary complaints.
The blogger, citing Google AI, says Justice Kathleen Banke defended his nomination and that direct appointments bring analytical talent to the courts.
The blogger, citing Google AI, says Scherb authored an October 2026 unpublished opinion rejecting a TikTok influencer's anti-SLAPP motion.
Limits: Second-hand AI-generated material on a personal blog; claims about the confirmation hearing and the anti-SLAPP opinion are not sourced and could not be confirmed here. Only the Scherb section was read.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-28.
LAist's retention explainer for LA and Orange County appellate justices lists Scherb as a Newsom-appointed Division Eight associate justice with a State Bar evaluation rating of "Well qualified" (dated 2024 in the guide).
Lists State Bar (JNE Commission) rating: Well qualified (2024).
Explains retention elections are yes/no; no California appellate justice has lost one since the 1930s, per a state analysis LAist cites.
Facts, claims & caveats
State Bar evaluation rating
Well qualified (LAist lists 2024)
Appointed by
Gov. Gavin Newsom
Bill Raftery of the National Center for State Courts says retention elections were meant as the people's opportunity to vote out somebody bad at their job.
Limits: One line on Scherb; no discussion of his rulings. The 2024 rating date predates his 2025 nomination as given by other sources; LAist does not explain it.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Secretary of Stateofficial analysisRecord
Official list of judicial retention contests: Matthew A. Scherb appears as Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Eight, with the question "Shall Associate Justice MATTHEW A. SCHERB be elected to the office for the term provided by law?"
Retention (yes/no) contest; no opponent.
Listed with fellow Division Eight Justice John Wiley.
Facts, claims & caveats
Office
Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Eight
Ballot question
Shall Associate Justice MATTHEW A. SCHERB be elected to the office for the term provided by law?
Limits: Ballot wording only; no biographical or performance information.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Secretary of Stateofficial analysisNeutral
Secretary of State voter-guide page listing Second District justices on the ballot by division; Matthew A. Scherb is listed under Division 8 with a link to the court's biography.
Division 8 justices on the ballot: John Wiley, Matthew A. Scherb, Victor G. Viramontes.
Facts, claims & caveats
Division
Second District, Division 8 (sits in Los Angeles)
Limits: Navigation page; no evaluation or record information.
Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Democratic Socialists of America, Los AngelesendorsementSupports
DSA-LA's guide says retention votes are a backstop and voters would be justified voting yes, no, or blank on all justices; it groups Scherb with five justices described as former corporate-law partners and says voters "could vote no" for that reason, while noting the value of varied expertise.
Describes Scherb as a former corporate-law partner specializing in media/entertainment litigation, copyright and trademarks.
Gives no explicit yes/no recommendation for this group.
DSA-LA says voters could vote no on Scherb and five others because they were corporate-law partners, but that a variety of expertise on the court is important.
DSA-LA says there is no campaign against any justice and no reason to expect any to lose.
Limits: Advocacy guide; judgment rests on career background, not rulings. Its "partner" description differs from the court biography, which describes him as practicing litigation at Winston & Strawn 2005-2011 (the courts newsroom calls him an associate). Only the judicial section was read.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-28.
Judicial Branch of Californiadecision recordRecord
Court listing of Scherb's published Division Eight opinions, October 2024 to October 2026: 3 authored opinions and no separate opinions. Covers published opinions only; most appellate decisions are unpublished.
Authored: Chin v. DoorDash (2026-10-05, employment arbitration), 8451 Melrose Property v. Akhtarzad (2026-07-23, judgment enforcement), People v. Moss (2026-05-04, criminal resentencing).
No published dissents or concurrences in the period.
Earliest listed opinion is May 2026.
Facts, claims & caveats
Authored published opinions (Oct 2024-Oct 2026)
3
Separate published opinions
0
The listing states authorship was read from each opinion's signature block.
Limits: Published opinions only; does not show joined opinions or unpublished work, so it understates his caseload.
Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8court opinionRecord
Scherb's majority holds an employee waived the federal Ending Forced Arbitration Act's protection: he withheld a known sexual-harassment claim "for strategic purposes" while opposing arbitration, then added it only after arbitration was compelled. Wiley dissents, calling it a blunder rather than waiver.
Treats EFAA rights as waivable under ordinary waiver rules, applying a clear-and-convincing standard and de novo review on undisputed facts.
Relies on the plaintiff's own statements that the omission was strategic and the amendment was made "specifically to avoid arbitration."
Distinguishes the Ninth Circuit's Ding cases (plaintiff learned of claim later) and Quilala (no waiver analysis).
Rejects a claimed "right to forum shop" to the extent it means forum-hopping "at whim."
Reverses denial of arbitration and the consolidation order.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
Chin v. DoorDash, Inc., B348844
Majority
Scherb, J., joined by Viramontes, J.
Dissent
Wiley, Acting P. J.
Disposition
Reversed; trial court directed to compel arbitration
The majority calls withholding known objections "unbecoming gamesmanship."
Wiley's dissent says the plaintiff's "whole goal was to get out of arbitration" and that is "the opposite of waiver."
Limits: Decided over a dissent on a novel federal-statute question; the court did not reach whether the harassment claim was adequately pleaded.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8court opinionRecord
Scherb's opinion for a unanimous panel affirms adding a tenant's family partners and their leasing company to a roughly $10.5 million commercial-lease judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, finding the undisclosed "one-for-all" family partnership was the real defendant and the partners sufficiently controlled the litigation.
Holds section 187 amendment may rest on an equitable analog of alter ego when the equities overwhelmingly favor it.
Works through due-process limits from Dillard v. McKnight (1949): partners are not automatically bound by a judgment against one partner.
Finds control from the totality: the partnership paid for the defense, the defense was vigorous, and every partner knew of the suit and impliedly ratified the tenant as representative.
Expressly declines to delineate "further rules" beyond this fact-bound finding.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
8451 Melrose Property, LLC v. Akhtarzad, B340673
Author
Scherb, J.; Stratton, P. J., and Wiley, J., concurring
Underlying judgment
$10,555,837 damages found by referee (2018), affirmed on earlier appeal
Disposition
Amended judgment affirmed
The trial court found the partnership was "virtually represented through Sina."
The appellants argued due process barred binding partners who were never named or served; the court rejected this on these facts.
Limits: Long opinion read selectively (background, section 187 framework, due-process and individual-partner sections; the middle section on the leasing company was skimmed). Fact-bound; the court disclaims broader rules.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8court opinionRecord
Scherb's opinion for a unanimous panel holds a court resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 may reimpose an upper term originally imposed in compliance with Apprendi without new jury findings on aggravating factors, siding with most appellate courts against People v. Gonzalez (2024).
Reads the section 1172.75(d)(4) proviso "[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term" as creating two rules, and calls Gonzalez's reading "counter textual."
Says the Legislature may limit the reach of ameliorative resentencing without raising new Apprendi concerns.
Notes the Supreme Court is reviewing the question in People v. Eaton (S289903).
Assumes without deciding the claim was not forfeited.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
People v. Moss, B343073
Author
Scherb, J.; Stratton, P. J., and Viramontes, J., concurring
Sentence
15 years on resentencing (from 17), upper term retained
Disposition
Affirmed
The defendant argued the Sixth Amendment required jury findings before an upper term could be reimposed.
Limits: Short opinion that largely adopts other courts' reasoning; the pending Eaton review may resolve the issue differently.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Eightcourt opinionRecord
Scherb's published opinion holding that a court resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 may reimpose an originally imposed upper term without new jury findings on aggravating factors.
Sides with Brannon-Thompson, Mathis and Dozier against People v. Gonzalez (2024) on reading section 1172.75(d)(4).
Reasons from the text: the "unless the court originally imposed the upper term" proviso creates two rules.
Notes the Supreme Court is considering the issue in People v. Eaton; the opinion itself was later marked review granted.
Facts, claims & caveats
Case
People v. Moss, B343073
Author
Scherb, J.; Stratton, P.J., and Viramontes, J., concurring
Disposition
Affirmed
Status
Review granted (per header)
Limits: One short criminal-sentencing opinion following existing majority appellate authority; the California Supreme Court granted review, so the holding may change.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
Judicial Council release announcing the Commission on Judicial Appointments' unanimous confirmation of Scherb to Division Eight, filling Justice Elizabeth Grimes's vacancy.
Confirmed unanimously by Chief Justice Guerrero, AG Bonta and Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert.
Bio: Supreme Court chambers attorney since 2021; deputy LA city attorney 2017-2021; appellate court attorney 2011-2017; Winston & Strawn associate 2005-2011.
Facts, claims & caveats
Vote
Unanimous, 3-0
Vacancy
Retirement of Justice Elizabeth A. Grimes
Limits: Announcement only; does not describe hearing testimony or evaluations.
Date stated in the document. Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.
California Courts of Appeal, Second DistrictotherRecord
Court biography: Scherb joined Division Eight in 2025 after a career as an appellate staff lawyer and government appellate litigator; he had not been a judge.
Nominated Aug. 7, 2025; confirmed Nov. 17, 2025.
Clerk to U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth (D.D.C.); Winston & Strawn litigation (copyright/trademark) 2005-2011.
Senior/lead appellate court attorney for Justice Kathleen Banke (1st District) 2011-2017; LA City Attorney civil appeals and writs 2017-2021.
Chambers attorney for Supreme Court Justice Martin Jenkins 2021-2025; volunteered at Public Counsel's appellate self-help clinic.
Facts, claims & caveats
Education
B.S. Computer Science, Yale; J.D., Northwestern
Nominated
2025-08-07
Confirmed
2025-11-17
Limits: Self-published official biography; no information on rulings.
Summary written 2026-10-29 in an operator-run Claude session. Link checked 2026-10-29.