Justice Kenneth R. Yegan

Blogger Daniel Faigin's ballot analysis recommends retaining Yegan, finding nothing disqualifying. His discussion of each justice is drawn explicitly from 'Google AI' output, not from his own reading of the record.

• Conclusion: Retain (Yes): 'None of this is a reason for disqualification.'
• Reports, from Google AI, that Yegan has no ethical scandals or discipline and has nearly 43 years of judicial service.
• Says Yegan is known for opinions criticizing the Legislature's 'constant tinkering' with sentencing laws, attributing this to a 'People v. Campbell'.
• Mentions his long work as a volunteer ski instructor for disabled athletes and veterans.

Reform California's Los Angeles County voter guide recommends RETAIN for Yegan, one of only three Second District justices it recommends retaining out of 33 listed. No reasons are given.

• Yegan: RETAIN.
• Same guide: Cody and Martinez DO NOT RETAIN; only Victoria Chavez, Frances Rothschild, and Yegan get RETAIN in the Second District.
• Also recommends DO NOT RETAIN for both Supreme Court justices on the ballot.

The Secretary of State's official guide lists Kenneth R. Yegan, Associate Justice, Division Six, among the Second District justices on the Nov. 3, 2026 retention ballot. It gives names and divisions only.

• Yegan is listed under Division Six with Presiding Justice Tari L. Cody.
• No qualifications, ratings, or arguments appear on this page.

A ballotscope compilation of Justice Yegan's published opinions listed on courts.ca.gov from October 2024 to October 2026: 33 authored opinions and 3 separate opinions (two dissents, one concurrence). It covers published opinions only; most appellate decisions are unpublished.

• Authored opinions: 33; separate opinions: 3 (dissents in P. v. Perkins, 2026-10-20, and In re J.C., 2026-09-02; concurrence in P. v. Garcia, 2025-10-06).
• 18 of the 33 authored entries are criminal appeals ('P. v.' captions), plus two juvenile or dependency matters (In re N.S., In re J.D.).
• Civil work includes family law (Marriage of Bowman, Marriage of R.K. & G.K.), insurance (Passport 420 v. Starr), public employment and pensions (Mendoza v. Board of Retirement, Egelston v. State Personnel Bd.), local government (Nguyen v. City of L.A., Ventura Harbor Restaurant Associates v. Ventura Port Dist.), and business disputes (Pacho Limited Partnership v. Eureka Energy).
• Several entries are modified or second versions of the same case (suffixes A or M), so the count of distinct cases is lower than 33.

Published Division Six decision affirming a San Luis Obispo sentence after a second trial judge granted a renewed Romero motion a first judge had denied. Justice Cody's majority holds the People forfeited the objection and that striking the strike was within discretion. Justice Yegan dissents: the second judge should have sent the motion back to the first, and the forfeiture rule should yield to the orderly administration of justice.

• Majority (Cody, P.J., joined by Baltodano, J.): the People never objected to the second judge hearing the renewed Romero motion, so the claim is forfeited; the court declines to excuse the forfeiture.
• Majority: dismissing the burglary strike was not an abuse of discretion given the strike's nature, the defendant's age at the time, and his background.
• Yegan dissent: 'The judge shopping lamp has now been lit'; one superior court judge should not 'overrule' another (citing People v. Sons and In re Alberto).
• Yegan dissent rejects 'mechanical jurisprudence', invokes Pound and Cardozo, and would reverse, vacate the sentence, let the defendant withdraw his plea, and return the case to the first judge.

Justice Yegan's opinion for a unanimous panel reversing a jury verdict of about $21.6 million (including $15 million in punitive damages) against Starr Indemnity, which insured a jet co-owned through Michael Avenatti's company. It holds that an applicant must disclose material facts even if the insurer never asks, that Avenatti's use of embezzled money to buy the jet was material as a matter of law, and that his knowledge is imputed to the company.

• Insurance Code sections 332, 334 and 336: materiality does not depend on whether the insurer asked or investigated; the test is the probable effect on the underwriting decision.
• As a matter of law, no reasonable insurer would cover government seizure of property it knew was bought with embezzled funds, so Starr could rescind.
• The 'malevolent agent' exception does not apply because Avenatti's acts benefited the company, at least initially, and Starr dealt in good faith.
• A footnote calls Avenatti 'a master deceiver' and lists Parrish, the company, and the insurer all as his victims; the court declines to opine on the trial court's criticism of Starr's 'lackadaisical' underwriting.

Justice Yegan's opinion for a unanimous panel affirming an attempted-murder conviction for a Pismo Beach driver who tried to shoot a police officer. It holds the voluntary-intoxication instruction, read with the other instructions, let jurors weigh intoxication on premeditation; the defendant forfeited any clarification by not asking; and counsel's failure to object caused no prejudice.

• Instructions are read as a whole: following People v. Castillo, no reasonable juror would think intoxication counted for intent to kill but not for premeditation.
• A voluntary-intoxication instruction is a pinpoint instruction, so the defense had to request any modification; failure to do so forfeits the claim.
• No ineffective-assistance prejudice: a jury could not rationally find the defendant sober enough to intend to kill yet too drunk to premeditate, especially after seeing the body-camera video.
• A footnote remarks that the defendant's backward-loaded magazine 'is the only reason' the officer was not killed.

Yegan dissented from a published Division Six decision reversing the transfer to adult court of J.C., who at 15 committed two gang murders, was indicted at 19, and is now 31. Yegan argued that accepting the Attorney General's concession of error 'may work a miscarriage of justice' because J.C. is too old for juvenile treatment and will be released.

• Majority (Cody, P.J., joined by Baltodano, J.) held that Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(2), as amended by SB 1391, barred the transfer because J.C. was apprehended while still within juvenile jurisdiction; the People conceded the error.
• Yegan's dissent: the Legislature may draw the age-15 line, and he applied it himself in an earlier case, but outright release of a 31-year-old who admitted two murders 'potentially puts the community at risk and is unacceptable.'
• Yegan would have rejected the Attorney General's concession, sought briefing from the Ventura District Attorney on the plea bargain's 'escape hatch', and flagged a possible extended commitment under § 1800.
• The dissent rests on policy and public-safety concerns more than on a competing reading of the statute; it does not dispute the majority's statutory reading.

On remand from the California Supreme Court, Yegan wrote for Division Six affirming the summary denial of Sidney Campbell's SB 1437 resentencing petition, holding that his jury instructions did not allow a conviction on imputed malice. The panel's earlier unpublished 2024 affirmance had relied on a line of cases the Supreme Court later disapproved in People v. Lopez (2026).

• Procedural history: the panel first affirmed in Dec. 2024 on the Berry-Vierwinden rationale; the Supreme Court granted review, disapproved that line in Lopez, and transferred the case back.
• On reconsideration, the court distinguishes Langi, Powell, and Maldonado because the only charged crime was murder, so the jury had to find Campbell personally harbored malice.
• Also rejects claims of improper judicial factfinding at the prima facie stage and reliance on firearm findings (distinguishing Offley).
• Filed Aug. 3, 2026 and certified for publication Sept. 1, 2026.

Writing for a unanimous Division Six panel, Yegan held that a family court setting fees under a marital settlement agreement's prevailing-party clause may still weigh the losing spouse's ability to pay under Family Code §§ 2030 and 2032, not only the Civil Code § 1717 lodestar. The court affirmed a $12,500 award against a $49,000 request.

• Holding: an MSA fee clause gives an alternative basis for fees but does not strip the family court of its equitable discretion.
• Distinguishes Walker v. Ticor Title (2012) as not a dissolution case and reads Marriage of Sherman (1984) as permitting, not requiring, a pure § 1717 award.
• Affirmed the trial court's finding that 'this is a limited asset case that has been over litigated', where both parties live on Social Security.
• Characteristic line: 'She forgets that the family law court is a court of fairness and equity.'

Published Division Six decision affirming robbery and carjacking convictions over a challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, the statute limiting peremptory juror challenges. Presiding Justice Gilbert's opinion refuses the Attorney General's concession of error and disapproves the division's own Uriostegui decision. Justice Yegan joins and adds a short concurrence arguing the statute's 'shall be deemed prejudicial' clause is unconstitutional. Justice Cody concurs only in the judgment.

• Majority (Gilbert, P.J., joined by Yegan, J.): a trial judge need not repeat the statute's wording verbatim to satisfy section 231.7; the objection was properly overruled.
• The majority disapproves People v. Uriostegui (2024), creating two conflicting opinions within one division, and notes the Attorney General 'concedes too easily.'
• Yegan concurrence: agrees with the District Attorney amicus that any error was not a miscarriage of justice, and says the Legislature cannot amend the Constitution by statute, so the automatic-prejudice clause is unconstitutional.
• Cody concurrence: agrees the challenge was valid but would distinguish Uriostegui rather than disapprove it.

The court's biography lists Yegan's career: Ventura County deputy public defender (1972-75), Court of Appeal staff attorney (1975-82), Ventura municipal and superior court judge (1983-90), and Associate Justice of Division Six since 1990.

• On the Court of Appeal since 1990, after seven years as a Ventura County trial judge.
• Began as a deputy public defender; also spent seven years as a judicial attorney at the same appellate court.
• Lists three law-journal articles (1977-1982) on sentencing, self-representation (Faretta), and depublication.
• Community service: volunteer ski instructor for Disabled Sports Eastern Sierra (since 2003) and wounded veterans (since 2007).