Justice Joshua Groban

Part IV of Daniel Faigin's personal ballot analysis blog (cahighways.org, 'Observations Along the Road') covering judicial offices on the November 2026 Los Angeles County ballot. For Justice Groban, Faigin applies a retain-unless-problems rule, relies on a Google AI search and finds no scandals or disciplinary concerns, and concludes 'Retain (Yes).'

• Faigin's stated approach for Supreme Court retention: reconfirm unless behavior justifies removal (malfeasance, ignoring conflicts of interest, judgments not in accordance with the law); he searches for issues and retains if none are found.
• Citing 'Google AI,' he says there are no major scandals, ethical violations, or disciplinary concerns regarding Groban and that his record since his 2019 appointment by Governor Jerry Brown 'remains clean.'
• He recounts that Groban is distantly related to the singer Josh Groban and has said he has 'no musical talent whatsoever.'
• He reports Groban, asked in a public interview about the worst part of the job, said: 'Staring at a statute and thinking, ‘Boy, the Legislature really screwed this up.’'
• He notes Groban's February 2024 statement dissenting from denial of a habeas petition and his May 2026 unanimous opinion in J.O. v. Superior Court against bad-faith blanket disqualification challenges, concluding 'Neither seems problematic.'
• Conclusion: 'Retain (Yes).'

CalMatters' 2026 voter guide page on the California Supreme Court retention election, explaining how retention votes work and giving brief background on the two associate justices on the ballot, Kelli M. Evans and Joshua Groban.

• Justices are appointed by the governor, confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments, face a first retention vote at the next gubernatorial election, and then every 12 years unless appointed to complete another justice's term.
• Justices cannot campaign for the job, and voters do not choose a replacement.
• CalMatters says ousting a justice is extremely rare; it happened once, in 1986, when three justices were unseated over their capital punishment records.
• Groban was appointed by former Gov. Jerry Brown in 2018 to complete the term of a retiring justice; he was one of Brown's senior policy advisers and earlier worked in private practice on antitrust and intellectual property.

GrowSF's San Francisco voter guide entry on the November 2026 California Supreme Court retention election, recommending a Yes vote to retain Justices Kelli M. Evans and Joshua Groban under its rule of retaining judges absent serious misconduct or poor judgment.

• GrowSF recommends voting Yes to retain Justices Kelli M. Evans and Joshua Groban.
• Its rule: retain a judge unless there is serious misconduct on the record or poor judgment that deviates from legal norms.
• It notes Groban was appointed by Governor Brown in 2018 and Evans by Governor Newsom in 2022.
• GrowSF says neither justice appears in the Commission on Judicial Performance public discipline record and it found no organized campaign against either.

The California Supreme Court's official biography of Associate Justice Joshua P. Groban: his service on the court since January 2019, his prior role as Senior Advisor to Governor Jerry Brown (including advising on more than 600 judicial appointments), his private practice in complex civil litigation, and his education and clerkship.

• Began serving on the California Supreme Court in January 2019.
• Previously Senior Advisor to Governor Jerry Brown, advising on judicial appointments, legal policy and legislative issues.
• Advised the governor on the appointment of over 600 judges, roughly one in three judges in the state, per the biography.
• Earlier in private practice specializing in complex civil litigation (antitrust, internal investigations, intellectual property).
• Served on a local school board, participated in mentor programs, lectured on judicial appointments, and has taught State Appellate Practice at UCLA School of Law.
• Grew up in San Diego; B.A. with honors and distinction from Stanford; J.D. cum laude from Harvard Law School; clerked for Judge William C. Conner (S.D.N.Y.).

A short Horvitz & Levy 'At the Lectern' blog post noting that Justices Joshua Groban and Kelli Evans will appear on the November 2026 ballot for yes-or-no retention votes, and explaining why Groban is on the ballot again after his 2022 election: he was elected to an unexpired term ending in January 2027 and now seeks a 12-year term of his own.

• Justices Groban and Evans will face 'yes' or 'no' retention votes in November.
• Groban was elected four years earlier to an unexpired term that ends in January 2027; he now seeks a 12-year term.
• This is Justice Evans's first time on the ballot; the blogger says he thinks she should also have been on the 2022 ballot.
• The post notes a third, newly appointed justice could also appear on the ballot if the governor filled the court's vacancy (described as over eight months long), the appointee were confirmed and sworn in, and a declaration of candidacy filed within about four weeks, which the post calls unlikely.

A WilmerHale client alert (republished on Mondaq/Legal 500) analyzing the California Supreme Court's May 28, 2026 decision in J.O. v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, which lets courts look behind coordinated 'blanket' peremptory disqualification motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. It explains prior law, the new burden-shifting framework, and practical effects for repeat litigants. It does not name the opinion's author.

• Under section 170.6, a properly invoked peremptory challenge to a judge is automatic, with no inquiry into the asserted prejudice; Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) held even blanket uses did not violate separation of powers.
• In J.O., the San Joaquin County Counsel's Office filed over 300 challenges in under four months against a judge who had admonished a member of that office, per the alert.
• The court held section 170.6 remains facially constitutional but its blanket abuse can materially impair the judiciary's core function and violate separation of powers; it overruled Solberg to the extent it barred as-applied challenges.
• Framework: an opponent's initial showing of a blanket policy of bad-faith challenges permits inquiry; the burden shifts to the movant to give a good-faith, case-specific basis; the court then decides whether the pattern is improper.
• The authors say the court emphasized that good-faith disqualification motions in individual cases are not restricted.
• Practical effects named: heightened scrutiny of institutional litigants (government entities, large corporate defendants, frequent plaintiffs), new litigation risk and delay, and less predictability in using 170.6 to manage assignments.

A California Appellate Report blog post by Shaun Martin reacting to J.O. v. Superior Court, the unanimous May 28, 2026 California Supreme Court opinion by Justice Groban that partly overrules a 1977 precedent and lets courts police 'bad faith' blanket Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 peremptory challenges to judges. Martin applauds the result but criticizes the opinion's stare decisis framing and says its remedial test is too lenient.

• Martin, a longtime critic of blanket 170.6 challenges, says repeat players such as district attorney's offices use them to effectively transfer judges out of departments.
• The opinion overrules the 1977 Supreme Court decision in part, holds that blanket peremptory challenges can violate separation of powers, and creates a Batson-like test to isolate 'bad faith' blanket challenges.
• Martin applauds the result and the unanimity: 'Well done.'
• He criticizes Groban's framing that the 'world had changed' since 1977 as 'somewhat weak sauce,' arguing the 1977 court was simply wrong then and the opinion should have said so.
• He calls the remedial scheme better than nothing but 'too soft,' because at its third stage the challenger need only show a 'subjective good faith' belief that the judge is biased, even if unreasonable.
• He credits the opinion for ruling out some reasons, such as disagreement with a judge's legal rulings, views that a judge is too soft or hard on crime, or a judge's race or gender.

A Horvitz & Levy 'At the Lectern' blog post by David S. Ettinger tallying the California Supreme Court's 45 opinions in the 2024-2025 term (September 1, 2024 to August 31, 2025), with per-justice statistics. For Justice Groban it reports five opinions for the court, one concurrence, and the dissents his opinions drew.

• The court issued 45 opinions in the term (22 civil, 23 criminal including nine death penalty), down from 58 and 55 in the two prior terms.
• All seven justices concurred in 34 of the 45 opinions (76 percent); counting two cases with separate concurrences but no dissents, the no-dissent rate was 80 percent.
• Justice Groban wrote five opinions for the court: two civil and three criminal, including two death penalty appeals.
• One of Groban's death penalty opinions drew a limited dissent, and three justices dissented from one of his civil decisions; three of his five opinions were unanimous.
• Groban filed one concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kelli Evans, and signed a Justice Goodwin Liu concurrence.
• For comparison, the post reports Justice Liu wrote nine opinions for the court, Chief Justice Guerrero and Justice Evans seven each, Justices Kruger and Corrigan six each, and Justice Jenkins five.

A Horvitz & Levy 'At the Lectern' blog post reporting that, the previous week, Justice Joshua Groban filed a statement dissenting from the California Supreme Court's denial of a habeas corpus petition, joined by Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans. The post's main point is that such separate statements are hard for the public to find; it does not describe the statement's content.

• Groban filed a statement dissenting from the denial of a habeas corpus petition; Justices Liu and Evans signed on.
• The habeas petition was filed in the Supreme Court in the first instance, so there was no Court of Appeal opinion to which the statement could be attached.
• Separate statements on denials are not published in the court's official reports; the practice was revived by Justice Liu in 2015, according to the post.
• The statement appears on the court's online docket (in a hard-to-read form), will appear in the minutes, and was published online by Westlaw with a note that it won't be in the California Reporter.
• The blog argues separate statements should be published in the Supreme Court's official reports.

A short installment (Part 2 of 6) of a California Supreme Court Review blog series on Justice Groban's tenure, giving only opinion counts through the end of 2021.

• In civil cases, Groban wrote seven opinions from joining the court through the end of 2021: five majority opinions, one concurrence and one dissent.
• On the criminal side he had written ten opinions, all majority opinions, with no concurrences or dissents.

The stored text is not the article catalogued under this listing ('SF Chronicle urges the election of Supreme Court justices'); the URL resolved to the home page of Horvitz & Levy's 'At the Lectern' blog, which shows only a list of recent post headlines and a sidebar of links. It barely concerns Justice Groban: his name appears only in a headline, 'Chronicle endorses Justices Groban and Evans', and in the sidebar list of current justices.

• The page is a blog index of recent post titles, not an article about Groban.
• One listed headline reads 'Chronicle endorses Justices Groban and Evans'; the endorsement itself is not reproduced.
• The sidebar lists Associate Justice Joshua P. Groban among the current justices and shows one seat as 'Vacancy'.

A Law.com (The Recorder) article by Cheryl Miller, of which only the opening is available (the rest is paywalled), reporting that Joshua Groban, Governor Jerry Brown's final nominee to the California Supreme Court, received the state judicial evaluators' top rating of 'exceptionally well qualified,' ahead of a Dec. 21 confirmation hearing.

• Groban was Gov. Brown's final nominee to the California Supreme Court.
• State judicial evaluators gave him their top rating, 'exceptionally well qualified.'
• The judicial appointments commission was set to hold confirmation hearings on the nomination Dec. 21.

A Press Democrat editorial board endorsement from October 2022 recommending a yes vote to retain all four California Supreme Court justices on that year's ballot, including Joshua Groban, and nine First District Court of Appeal justices. It addresses Groban only briefly.

• The board says that, as non-lawyers, it assessed the 13 justices on the ballot and found no reason to oppose any retention.
• It says Groban, Goodwin Liu (both Brown appointees) and Martin Jenkins have extensive legal and judicial experience and, like Patricia Guerrero, received the top rating from the judicial evaluations commission.
• The board says it would prefer shifting retention decisions to the Commission on Judicial Appointments, which would require a constitutional amendment.
• It notes the court's rulings are often unanimous and that it doesn't agree with every ruling.

The stored text is not the article catalogued under this listing ('SF Chronicle urges the election of Supreme Court justices'); the URL resolved to the home page of Horvitz & Levy's 'At the Lectern' blog, which shows only a list of recent post headlines and a sidebar of links. It barely concerns Justice Groban: his name appears only in a headline, 'Chronicle endorses Justices Groban and Evans', and in the sidebar list of current justices.

• The page is a blog index of recent post titles, not an article about Groban.
• One listed headline reads 'Chronicle endorses Justices Groban and Evans'; the endorsement itself is not reproduced.
• The sidebar lists Associate Justice Joshua P. Groban among the current justices and shows one seat as 'Vacancy'.

An edited question-and-answer transcript, published by the California Lawyers Association's antitrust section journal (Competition), of a conversation with Justice Joshua Groban at the section's 2020 Golden State Institute, conducted by Cheryl Lee Johnson and Courtney A. Palko. Groban discusses his career, his work overseeing judicial appointments for Governor Jerry Brown, the traits he believes make a good judge, how the Supreme Court decides which cases to take, advice on briefs and oral argument, writing separately, and why he values a judiciary that reflects the communities it serves.

• Groban describes his path (clerkship, Paul Weiss, Munger Tolles & Olson, general counsel to Brown's 2010 campaign, senior advisor overseeing judicial appointments) as largely 'serendipity' rather than a plan.
• He says Brown's administration sought 'excellent lawyers who would make excellent judges' from any practice background, not only prosecutors or commercial litigators.
• He lists temperament, intelligence, openness followed by decisiveness, empathy and emotional IQ as key judicial traits, and says he now ranks 'pure smarts' about third or fourth.
• He tells his clerks 'rule number one is try and get it right' and that he wants staff who will disagree with him.
• He says collegiality on the Court makes it easier to write separately, e.g., telling an author 'I just read the statute differently.'
• He says the Supreme Court is 'not a court of error correction' and grants review mainly for conflicts among lower courts or issues of statewide importance; he values amicus briefs that explain real-world effects.
• His main oral-argument advice is to 'answer the question that has been put to you.'
• He names Robinson, a certified question from the Ninth Circuit about state habeas procedure, as an opinion he is proud of.
• He states 'our courts should look like the communities they serve,' including diversity of practice background.

Full text of the California Supreme Court's opinion in J.O. v. Superior Court (S287285), authored by Justice Groban for a unanimous court (Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Evans, and Presiding Justice Brown sitting by assignment). The opinion overrules Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) to the extent Solberg held that 'blanket' abuses of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 peremptory judge challenges are immune from as-applied separation-of-powers challenges, and sets out a burden-shifting procedure for courts to inquire into alleged bad-faith blanket challenges.

• Petitioner J.O., a conservatee, alleged that San Joaquin County Counsel filed about 325 section 170.6 challenges against Judge Erin E. Guy Castillo in less than four months after she admonished a deputy county counsel, leading to her reassignment from the conservatorship department.
• The opinion opens by quoting Madison's Federalist No. 51 and frames the case as one about each branch's means to resist encroachment by the others.
• It reviews Austin v. Lambert (1938), Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) and Solberg (1977), and the Court of Appeal's criticism of Solberg in People v. Superior Court (Tejeda) (2016).
• The opinion acknowledges stare decisis ('We do not lightly depart from our own precedent') but concludes Solberg itself contemplated reassessment as conditions changed.
• It relies on changes since 1977: felony filings rising from 54,653 to 179,821 (FY 2023-24), budget cuts, judge shortages, specialty and collaborative courts, and new laws such as the CARE Act, Proposition 36 (2024), the Racial Justice Act, SB 1437 and AB 333.
• It holds the separation-of-powers conflict lies between the Legislature (through the statute's terms) and the judiciary, so blanket abuses by any party, not only executive-branch offices, may be challenged.
• Procedure: an objecting party must make a prima facie showing of a bad-faith blanket policy; a different judge then holds a hearing at which the proponent must give a clear and reasonably specific good-faith explanation; the framework is modeled on the Batson/Gutierrez burden-shifting test.
• The court rejected the California Judges Association's proposal to bar government attorneys from filing section 170.6 motions as 'too far-reaching' and 'improper judicial legislating,' and noted the Legislature remains free to amend section 170.6.
• The court took 'no view on the truth of petitioner's allegations' and remanded to the Court of Appeal.

A California Courts 'Citings Archive' page for J.O. v. Superior Court (S287285, May 28, 2026). It does not contain the opinion text; it lists the web pages the opinion cites, which the court archives as PDFs.

• Lists nine web sources cited in the J.O. opinion, including Federalist No. 51 (Yale Avalon Project), a 2022 Judicial Needs Assessment report to the Legislature, a Desert Sun article on Riverside County criminal cases dismissed amid a judge shortage, an article on California court budget cuts, and court materials on collaborative courts and CARE proceedings.
• Gives the case number S287285 and date May 28, 2026, with a link to case details.

Full text of People v. Morris (S284751), a California Supreme Court opinion authored by Justice Groban (joined by Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger and Evans), with a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Guerrero and a dissent by Justice Yegan (Court of Appeal, sitting by assignment). The majority holds that under Penal Code section 189, subdivision (e)(2), as amended by Senate Bill 1437, a nonkiller who acted with intent to kill is liable for felony murder only if he aided or abetted the actual killer in the lethal act itself, not merely in the underlying felony; it reverses the Court of Appeal's denial of resentencing relief and remands.

• Morris sought resentencing under section 1172.6 to vacate a murder conviction arising from a 1987 home-invasion robbery and rape in which the victim, Stockwell, was shot; the record did not establish whether Morris or his codefendant was the actual killer.
• The majority reads the phrase 'aided . . . or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree' by its plain, commonsense meaning to require aid in the killing, writing that the court interprets the language 'to mean just what it says.'
• It relies on statutory structure: the Legislature used 'underlying felony' in subdivision (e)(3) but not in (e)(2), signaling different required acts.
• Having found the text clear, the majority says it need not address the Attorney General's legislative-history arguments, but adds that the history would not change the result.
• It rejects the Attorney General's argument that its reading creates an illogical structure in subdivision (e), saying the Legislature may have created 'different paths to liability' tied to culpability.
• The majority disapproves People v. Lopez (2023), People v. Lopez (2024) and People v. Taito (2025), and leaves the Attorney General's remaining arguments, including the financial-gain special circumstance, for the Court of Appeal on remand.
• Chief Justice Guerrero concurs, finding the statute not plain but in 'relative equipoise,' and joins the result by applying the rule of lenity.
• Justice Yegan dissents, arguing '175 years of felony-murder precedent should not be set aside by an ambiguous statute,' and that Morris assisted even under the majority's reading by helping handcuff the victim.

Full text of People v. Salazar (S275788), a unanimous California Supreme Court opinion authored by Justice Groban (joined by Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Jenkins and Evans). The court holds that the record did not 'clearly indicate' the trial court would have imposed the same middle-term sentence had it known of Senate Bill 567's new lower-term presumption for offenders whose qualifying trauma contributed to the offense, reverses the Court of Appeal, and orders a remand for resentencing.

• Salazar was convicted in Ventura County of false imprisonment and inflicting corporal injury on a former dating partner (acquitted of kidnapping and attempted robbery) and sentenced in November 2020 to seven years four months, using the middle term doubled for a prior strike.
• Senate Bill 567, effective January 1, 2022 while his appeal was pending, created a presumption for the lower term when psychological, physical or childhood trauma contributed to the offense; the parties agreed it applied, and the Attorney General conceded the record suggested a qualifying trauma.
• A divided Court of Appeal declined to remand, finding the record clearly showed the trial court would not have chosen the low term.
• Applying People v. Gutierrez (2014), the Supreme Court found the denial of a Romero motion, consecutive sentences, the protective order and the court's comments did not clearly show what the trial court would do under the new presumption, because each involved a different legal inquiry.
• The opinion states that after a substantive change in sentencing law it is 'almost always speculative' for a reviewing court to predict what the sentencing court would have done, and that remand is required unless the record clearly shows it would be idle.
• The court expressly took no view on what sentence should be imposed on remand, noting either keeping the sentence or applying the lower term would be within the trial court's discretion.

Text of People v. Gray (S269237), as reposted by Stanford's California Supreme Court Resources (SCOCAL) site. Chief Justice Guerrero wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court, joined by Justice Groban and the other justices; Justice Groban also wrote a short concurring opinion. The court held that hearsay qualifying as a spontaneous statement under Evidence Code section 1240 is not automatically admissible at a probation revocation hearing; the trial court must balance the probationer's confrontation interest against the government's good cause for not producing the witness. Groban's concurrence emphasizes that potential emotional or mental harm to a witness, including alleged domestic-violence victims, can count toward good cause.

• The Court of Appeal had held that statements within a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception automatically satisfied minimum due process at a probation revocation hearing; the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
• The majority applies the balancing test from People v. Arreola (1994) and disapproves People v. Stanphill to the extent inconsistent; it states witness unavailability is neither a threshold requirement nor dispositive.
• Justice Groban's concurrence writes 'separately to emphasize' that Arreola recognizes a risk of 'mental or emotional harm' to the declarant as part of good cause.
• The concurrence cites law-review research and People v. Brown (2004) on recantation and non-cooperation in domestic violence cases and on the emotional bonds between victims and abusers.
• Groban states he expresses no view on the factual record or whether good cause can be shown on remand.

Full text of People v. Cooper (S273134), a unanimous California Supreme Court opinion authored by Justice Groban (joined by Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Jenkins and Evans). Applying Assembly Bill 333's new gang-law elements retroactively, the court holds that the jury's lack of instruction that predicate offenses must have 'commonly benefited' the gang in a 'more than reputational' way was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and reverses Cooper's gang enhancement and the dependent firearm enhancement, with remand for any retrial.

• Cooper, a Lueders Park gang member, was convicted on retrial in Los Angeles County of the 2012 first degree murder of rival gang member Nicos Mathis in Compton, with gang and firearm enhancements, and sentenced to 75 years to life; the murder conviction itself was not at issue.
• AB 333 (effective January 1, 2022) requires proof that predicate offenses 'commonly benefited a criminal street gang' and that the benefit is 'more than reputational'; the parties agreed it applied retroactively and that Chapman v. California governs prejudice.
• The opinion holds that a gang's 'primary activities' and whether a specific predicate offense commonly benefited the gang are distinct questions, so evidence that two members each committed a robbery or narcotics sale was not enough.
• It reasons the Attorney General's reading would make AB 333's new requirement 'mere surplusage' and conflicts with legislative history aimed at 'making the standards for applying a gang enhancement more rigorous.'
• It closely examines the gang expert's testimony, concluding that the 'most senior' member described was Mahan's son, not predicate offender Mahan, and rejecting 'out of hand' inferring seniority from a family member.
• The opinion notes the Court of Appeal's decision was the only one cited affirming a gang enhancement after AB 333 for a trial held before the law, and notes circumstantial evidence and nonfinancial benefits may prove a common benefit in other cases.

Full text of People v. Ng (S080276), the automatic appeal in the death-penalty case of Charles Chitat Ng, with an opinion of the Court authored by Justice Groban and joined by Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Jenkins, Guerrero and Presiding Justice Pollak (sitting by assignment). The court rejected every claim and affirmed Ng's 11 first degree murder convictions, the multiple-murder special circumstance, and the death sentence 'in its entirety.'

• The victims disappeared from Northern California between July 1984 and April 1985; the case broke after Ng and accomplice Leonard Lake attempted to shoplift a vise in June 1985 and Lake later killed himself in custody.
• Ng was in custody in Canada for years before extradition; the opinion notes his representation involved several attorneys, 37 Marsden motions, and a brief period of self-representation.
• The opinion addresses claims on the right to counsel and self-representation (Faretta, standby counsel, refusal to appoint the San Francisco Public Defender), venue change, competency, restraints, extradition-hearing testimony, evidentiary and instructional issues, penalty-phase issues, and judicial bias.
• On several claims the opinion decides on alternative grounds, e.g., 'We need not decide whether defendant waived his claim, because there was no Sixth Amendment violation regardless,' and finds asserted prejudice 'too speculative.'
• On judicial bias, it holds that a Court of Appeal disqualification of one trial judge did not amount to a finding of bias and that adverse rulings do not establish bias.
• It rejects standard challenges to California's death penalty law by citing precedent, and finds no cumulative prejudice from two assumed errors (no section 987.05 hearing; admission of Gouveia's testimony) and two alternative harmless-error analyses.

A Northern California Record (Legal Newsline) news report by Jonathan Bilyk on the California Supreme Court's unanimous ruling in J.O. v. Superior Court, an opinion written by Justice Joshua Groban and filed May 28, which lets courts scrutinize 'blanket' judicial disqualification (recusal) challenges for good faith. The article quotes the opinion at length on why the 1977 precedent Solberg v. Superior Court is 'no longer tenable' and describes the new bad-faith procedure.

• The underlying dispute: in August 2024 San Joaquin County Counsel moved to remove Judge Erin Guy Castillo from J.O.'s conservatorship case; J.O. alleged these were improper blanket filings after the judge admonished a deputy county lawyer, and that county counsel had filed 325 reassignment motions.
• J.O. asked the Third District Court of Appeal to revisit Solberg v. Superior Court (1977); that court refused, and the case went to the Supreme Court.
• The article reports that Groban traced nearly a century of disqualification law, acknowledged 'concerns about decisional consistency,' and explained why Solberg 'is no longer tenable' given caseload growth, budget cutbacks, judge shortages and judicial specialization.
• Groban wrote that the court agrees with the Solberg minority opinion by Justice Mathew Tobriner that 'our constitutional structure requires us to act.'
• The court held that the separation-of-powers problem arises from any litigant's bad-faith blanket challenges, not only those by executive agencies, siding with the California Judges Association and the California District Attorneys Association on that point.
• New procedure: the opponent of a disqualification motion must make a prima facie showing of bad faith; a different judge then holds a hearing at which the challenger must explain the challenge. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeal.
• Justice Tracie Brown of the First District Court of Appeal sat by designation; J.O. was represented by public defenders.